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THESIS ABSTRACT 
Christopher M. Thomas 
Master of Arts 
Department of Geography 
June 2013 
Title: Participatory Forest Management and Actor Role Dependency in Arabuko-Sokoke 
Forest Reserve, Kenya 
Conservation management of state-controlled forests has shifted away from strict, 
centralized management by incorporating community-based co-management initiatives. 
Often termed participatory forest management, these initiatives include local residents in 
forest planning, implementation, and management. This thesis examines two case studies 
located at the Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Reserve, Kenya. The case studies illustrate how 
imbalances of power establish participant (actor) roles through policies set by 
governments and NGOs. Power imbalances are perpetuated through hegemonies of 
postcolonialism that reinforce actor role perceptions. Awareness and understanding of 
role perceptions is paramount in participatory conservation initiatives that benefit both 
the physical environment and community development. Analyzing histories of past 
conservation initiatives with assessments of current and perceived future issues may 
reduce unrealistic role expectations. Examining actor role contributions at multiple scales 
of power is necessary. Reflection upon how roles influence perceptions may decrease 
failures of conservation initiatives involving affluent global donors and marginalized 
local communities.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Human pressures on lands designated for conservation are common throughout 
the world, and the future management of protected lands is evolving. Globally, this 
evolution has seen a shift from a top-down approach to the acknowledgement of benefits 
deriving from community-based conservation management schemes (Berkes, 2004). 
Local community participation in state-protected forest management has been 
implemented in much of the world and is often called participatory forest management 
(PFM) (Schreckenberg & Luttrell, 2009). While political ecologists and state 
governments often acknowledge the benefits derived from PFM—and in some cases 
institutionalize it into state policy—top-down and/or exclusionary methods are still 
practiced by governments whose policies include PFM mandates. The application and 
enforcement of PFM can often be as haphazard or ineffective as the more exclusionary 
methods they are trying to replace (Koech, et al., 2009; Robbins, et al., 2009).  
In many cases, the exclusion of communities adjacent to protected forests in favor 
of wildlife or vegetation habitat can lead to conflict and distrust between adjacent 
communities and the state. For example, the Kenya Forestry Research Institute (KEFRI) 
articulates this conflict: 
Communities that have heavily depended on the forest for a long time for 
livelihoods based on individual decision-making on the utilization of forest 
resources will face conflicts when it comes to implementation of corporate 
decisions and agreement in the [villager association] situation (Koech et al., 2009, 
pg. 6). 
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On account of these changes in forest management practices, it is necessary to evaluate 
how these changes affect and incorporate marginalized communities that are recently 
included into the forest management process.  
This thesis examines how relationships between actors (e.g. stakeholders such as 
individuals, groups, communities, and organizations) involved in conservation are 
dependent on the perceived or expected roles (e.g., job, objective, or responsibility) that 
stakeholders at multiple scales, both vertical and horizontal (Berkes, 2004) interact within. 
By exploring case studies highlighting these multiscalar interactions, I argue that the 
incongruences of perceived roles—operating within an inherent structure of 
interdependency—greatly affect the success or failure of conservation initiatives, such as 
PFM.  
 To accomplish this, I place the roles of various conservation initiative participants 
within a dependent, postcolonial milieu within which these actors interact.  This context 
heavily influences the multiscalar interactions and roles that are perceived and/or played 
out by developing and solidifying interdependencies between actors. Each actor is 
situated within a structured, global economic hierarchy that has its roots in an economic 
world system established during the age of colonialism. This global world systems 
hierarchy has created a lasting legacy of economic dependencies that has outlasted the 
shackles of colonialism. Through hegemonies of Western conservation values and 
histories of power, combining the global world systems structure with postcolonialim is 
necessary to better understand the complexity of local identities and multiscalar cultural 
forces that shape actor roles.  
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 In this thesis, I analyze actors who are influenced or influence conservation 
initiatives in and around the Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Reserve (ASF) on the Kenyan coast. 
In Kenya, PFM policies have been incorporated into state law, thus framing forest 
governance. But the implementation of PFM practices has been haphazard due to the 
order in which policies have been introduced. In 1997, a PFM pilot project—to gauge its 
general success—was conducted in ASF, and its management plan has been approved by 
the Kenyan government since 2002. The vision of how PFM would be incorporated into 
national policy is illustrated in a 2004 ASF-affiliated document from the KEFRI: 
It is envisaged that the result from [ASF] pilot project will guide the evolving 
forest policy not just in Arabuko-Sokoke but also for the whole forestry sector in 
Kenya. This is all geared towards formulating a framework for introducing local 
communities and other stakeholders into the operational management of forest 
resources (Mbuvi et al., 2004, pg. 7). 
The Kenya Forests Act (2005) requires community groups to register as Community 
Forest Associations (CFAs) to be considered stakeholders in joint-forest management. 
The Kenya Constitution (2010) insists on community involvement in forest and natural 
resource management. Therefore, community members adjacent to the forest who do not 
register as a CFA cannot legally participate in forest management. When implementing 
PFM in 1998, neither the CFA structure nor the constitutional requirements of joint-forest 
management had been required. These baseline policies were not in place that would 
increase project accountability. Taking into account the timeline reversal of PFM 
approval and state laws, the manner in which CFAs have been incorporated into the PFM 
process has been either unclear or ineffective. 
According to CFA members and parastatal1 officials I interviewed at ASF, the 
development of CFAs around ASF has not been a streamlined process, and many 
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adjacent dwellers either do not know of their existence or do not see the benefits of being 
a part of them. Joint-management of ASF at the only established CFA (out of the three 
intended CFAs around the forest) has deteriorated due—in part—to a reliance on older, 
exclusionary practices of forest enforcement that deny many local stakeholders access to 
forest resources. Therefore, villagers still harvest resources without permission to 
supplement their small incomes or maintain livelihoods that existed before government 
forest protection. Subsequently, there is little evidence that state policies, which directly 
impact forest access, have been implemented on the ground or have benefited the scope 
of villagers as implied by state documents.  
The ASF is a 400 km2 coastal forest in Kenya that provides habitat to a number of 
endangered and critically endangered wildlife species. The forest is also utilized by 
forest-adjacent villagers for non-wildlife resources, such as fuelwood, timber, 
woodcarvings for tourists, and medicinal plants (Muriithi & Kenyon, 2002). While the 
forest is under the joint authority of the parastatals Kenya Forest Service (KFS) and 
Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), poaching2 of wildlife and non-animal resources is 
rampant and threatens endangered species and their habitats, as well as rural livelihoods, 
through violation of institutionalized rules-of-use (Collins, 2008). In addition to the two 
parastatals and CFAs working to protect the forest, community-based organizations 
(CBOs) operating in tandem with or under the direction from non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) also have influence on forest conservation through conservation 
initiatives intended to both protect the forest and improve localized economic 
development. Increasing community access to global and regional markets while 
establishing local markets and is termed income-generating activities (IGAs) helps 
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accomplish this. Revenue to support IGAs comes largely from foreign aid that fills 
financial holes created by state inefficiencies. 
The Kenya Forests Act limits access to resources within protected forests and defines 
ownership as all non-private or local authority forests being “vested in the state” (2005). 
These protected forests, such as forest reserves, are the property of the state (Kenya 
Forests Act, 2005). The resources within state forests are defined within the Forests Act 
(2005): 
“Forest produce” includes bark, animal droppings, beeswax, canes, charcoal, 
creepers, earth, fibre, firewood, frankincense, fruit, galls, grass, gum, honey, 
leaves, flowers, limestone, moss, murram, myrrh, peat, plants, reeds, resin, rushes, 
rubber, sap, seeds, spices, stones, timber, trees, water, wax, withies, and such 
other things as may be declared by the Minister [of Forests and Wildlife] to be 
forest produce for the purpose of this Act (p. 236). 
The state acting through KFS have lawful (de jure) control over these resources 
(produce), and this control extends outside forest boundaries into villages. One villager I 
interviewed expressed his frustration by asking “is the KFS patrolling and controlling 
ASF or outside [the forest] now too?” (Jilore villager, personal communication, August 
23, 2011). Village elders confirmed this as a tension between villagers and the KFS when 
I asked them about the relationship between the forest managers and adjacent dwellers.  
However, access rules governed by private or state property rights (de jure) are only 
part of the rules-of-use and access equation. Ribot and Peluso (2003) illustrate that the 
concept of access encompasses all possible means of benefiting from something—such as 
forest products—and that social, economic, and informal access rules (de facto) can have 
far greater impacts on how space is used than formal rules established by property 
regimes. Access to authority, economic capital, and technology by marginalized 
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communities can also trump legal property rights (Ribot & Peluso, 2003). At ASF, non-
property access regimes manifests based a difference in proximity and the level of 
communication with state officials, access to capital through markets, and access to 
technology through training and tools needed for IGA implementation and maintenance. 
Since non-sanctioned resources are extracted from ASF in spite of state enforcement, the 
social and economic rules-of-use that regulate access plays a significant role in the 
management and governance of the forest. Access to such resources is governed by the 
relationships between actors3, such as stakeholders and community members involved or 
impacted by forest conservation.  
Structure of Thesis 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter I outlines the conceptual 
framework, the context in which this thesis focuses on, and establishes the order by 
which the thesis is presented. Chapter II illustrates the methodologies used both in 
fieldwork and research in the university setting. It also demonstrates how interviews of 
community members and stakeholders were achieved, including how interviews were 
shaped by the researchers themselves and the social environments of where the 
interviews took place. The methodology exhibits that while interviews with stakeholders, 
community members, and local ecologists were invaluable, there were drawbacks to the 
methods used. This chapter also illustrates how the work done in this thesis is but a 
snapshot of a much larger scheme in the region.  
Chapter III explores the theoretical frameworks employed for the analysis of the case 
studies.  It briefly outlines theories of political ecology, knowledge categorization and 
disparities of power within communities, participatory development, and access. It also 
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explores theories of dependency, postcolonialism, and role perceptions. The latter three 
theories act as the foundation for my analysis of the connectivity and interactions 
between actors at both horizontal and vertical scales (Berkes, 2004). The review of these 
theories is vital in understanding how actor roles are solidified through the 
interdependencies inherent in conservation initiatives.  
Visualizing the connectivity and dependencies of actors who interact at multiple 
scales, as well as each role, affects actors at multiple scales in turn, whether directly or 
indirectly (Figure 1). Due to the nature of interactions within the enforcement of 
conservation laws or interactions in conservation initiatives, actors are dependent on one 
another to fulfill their perceived or expected roles that other actors anticipate. These 
perceived roles are not always written within law, and actors within communities often 
have roles that differ from those perceived by actors, such as access to forest resources 
through de jure and de facto rules-of-use.  
For example, the state and conservation NGOs expect KFS officials to carry out 
de jure policies governing forest resource access. In spite of that, forest-adjacent 
communities also rely on the same officials to maintain de facto roles of resource access 
that permit some actors the access needed for income supplementation. While 
unsanctioned and illegal in the eyes of the state (and other actors within the parastatals), 
these de jure rules-of-use may need to be maintained for social cohesion among different 
actors. De jure rules-of-use can be common in resource management (Robbins et al., 
2009). The thesis will show how these theories are employed to demonstrate how 
perceptions of roles are constructed, maintained, and affect the success of conservation 
initiatives around ASF. 
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Chapter IV explores the study site around ASF. This chapter examines a brief 
history of national parks, how participatory forest management was institutionalized into 
state law, and how this history directly relates to Arabuko-Sokoke. It also explores the 
ecology of the forest, its main flora and fauna, and how communities, government 
agencies, and other stakeholders utilize the forest and its resources. It examines the ethnic 
communities around the forest, their history, social relations, and relations between 
conservation initiative stakeholders and forest-adjacent communities.  
Chapters V and VI explore two case studies of conservation initiatives around 
ASF. Both case studies show how a state-mandated forest management project or a 
foreign-funded education scheme utilize the same sets of actors and rely on their 
expected roles to be filled in different ways. When one actor does not fulfill their 
expected roles, the web becomes weakened and the effects on forest conservation are 
impacted. These roles are maintained by power relations heavily influenced by history of 
colonial and neocolonial legacies—both economical and cultural. 
The case study in Chapter V examines the PFM pilot project situated in Dida on 
the southwestern corner of ASF. In 1997, a large pilot project to establish PFM in Kenya 
was jointly funded by the United States Aid and Development (USAID) through Birdlife 
International, the European Union (EU), and the UK Department for International 
Development. The Kenya Government, on recommendation of the Arabuko-Sokoke 
Forest Management Team  (ASFMT), approved implementation of the pilot project in 
2002. Many stakeholders saw it as the model for future PFM development throughout the 
state and the site where it was implemented is visited frequently by groups in Kenya, 
Tanzania, and persons affiliated with foreign aid organizations interested in the PFM 
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process. At the time of field interviews in July 2011, most of the IGAs approved by the 
state had been implemented, but community access to timber within forest boundaries 
and joint forest management is stalled. This places greater pressure on foreign donors to 
help support IGAs while allowing consistent CFA participation in general management 
with local parastatal administrators to be delayed indefinitely. Community representation 
through CFA administrators is subject to criticism, as there appears to be a 
disproportionate distribution of access to IGAs that favor the administrators themselves—
who are the first contact point for incoming conservation schemes (Koech et al., 2009).  
Chapter V concludes with analysis of how stakeholder roles (perceived by the 
actors themselves and by those who interact with them) affect how the PFM process stalls 
or moves forward. Interdependencies inherent in conservation initiatives tie these 
perceived roles together in a manner that, when grievances are not aired, help lead to 
inaction and misperceptions. 
Chapter VI contains the second case study which focuses on the Ngamani anti-
bushmeat project in Malanga, a German NGO-funded (NABU) and local CBO-supported 
community association (group) that attempts to reduce poaching in ASF by providing 
community members an alternative income and/or source of protein with small-scale 
poultry farming. Unfortunately, the project fell apart shortly after its implementation due 
to a number of factors that were expressed by project group members living near ASF. 
These factors include perceived broken promises, lack of interests, and the non-adherence 
to group member needs and desires. This non-adherence is due to both government 
wildlife policies and NABU’s financial constraints. The perceived expectations and roles 
of different communities manifest through the dependent relationships of the horizontal 
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linkages—both local and regional—as well as horizontal linkages between NABU and 
Nature Kenya. Therefore, perceptions of actor roles play a large role in the success of 
these policies.  
 Chapter VII reveals some implications for further research in this area. There are 
pieces of the puzzle in the form of ecological research that has been performed on ASF—
largely in the form of bird habitat—but this information combined with future faunal 
population surveys and the longitudinal human disturbance monitoring data still needs to 
be compiled and analyzed for correlations. As the resolution of orthophotos representing 
the forest improves, remote sensing will play a large role in forest dynamic analyses. 
 Chapter VIII concludes the thesis with an overview of how the two case studies 
reveal that perceived actor roles created through inherent interdependencies of 
conservation initiatives greatly contributes to the implementation, stalling, or collapse of 
the many conservation initiatives, following both bottom-up and top-down approaches. It 
is also necessary to use actor roles in congruence with other social, cultural, and political 
factors—at multiple scales—to understand conservation initiative dynamics. And finally, 
this chapter explains the purpose of this thesis is to allow stakeholders a chance to voice 
concerns over issues that can help create new or closed dialogues between stakeholders 
and their greater communities. It is through these dialogues that the renegotiation and 
recognition of opinions can be aired and addressed.  
 
Notes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A parastatal is a semi-autonomous state government organization. A parastatal may create some of its 
own laws and rules of governance, but none of those laws or actions can conflict with laws and rules of its 
parent government. While each parastatal may have a separate charter, a defining characteristic is the state 
government has final authority over the parastatal and may alter the charter when needed. Any action 
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performed by the parastatal that would affect the state would most likely need to be permissible by that 
state. 
 
2 The term “poaching” is used throughout this thesis and is defined as the unlawful hunting of wildlife. 
Although the term is not popular in most academic discourses due to the negative connotations associated 
with it (see Steinhart, 2006), it is necessary to contrast it with the trapping of wildlife outside (hunting) and 
inside (poaching) of ASF. In addition, the term “poaching” is used in English, by interviewees, parastatal 
officials, NGO affiliates, and my research assistant.  
 
3 For this thesis, actor is used in the actor-network theoretical framework as illustrated by Latour (1987) as 
“not the source of an action, but the moving target of a vast array of entities swarming toward it” (pg. 116). 
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CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY 
My methods included 15 individual interviews, 8 focus groups. These interviews 
were with stakeholders of conservation initiatives at multiple scales and villagers living 
adjacent to ASF. I also had several informal discussions with residents and villagers that 
allowed me better insight and context for issues involving the Kenya coast. All formal 
interviews were conducted with the assistance of a research assistant who was both an 
interpreter and forest expert. Focus group participants were diverse in composition but 
consisted of either members of registered associations or village elders. When possible, 
focus groups comprising only of women were valued due to socio-cultural norms of 
appropriate times of expressing opinions. I also collected and analyzed 33 secondary data 
texts. These documents were primarily the KEFRI library in Gede. Due to the 
permanency of the documents, I photographed each document with an iPad camera for 
later analysis.  
Participant observation and personal role reflexivity were vital in my analysis and 
results. The goal of this fieldwork was intended (and presented as) not only for building 
my thesis, but also as a way to provide community members an outlet to express 
grievances about conservation issues and how conservation initiatives are managed 
around ASF. These grievances will be included in a final report submitted to all 
stakeholders in Kenya.  
While I traveled to Kenya during the summer of 2011 for two months, there was a 
significant amount of preliminary research that went into the interview process before my 
visit. To accomplish this, I looked at primary documents relating to PFM and 
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conservation initiatives around the forest. These discourses included the Arabuko-Sokoke 
Forest Management Plan (ASFMT, 2002) that was created in response to the pilot 
project’s numerous workshops, the Kenya Forests Act (Kenya, 2005), and the Kenya 
Constitution (Kenya, 2010). These documents provided me with an understanding of 
state policy and PFM propositions. They revealed how state and parastatals framed the 
issue that PFM needed to address, as well as how the legal framework would work to 
solve them. 
Primary documents located at the Kenya Forestry Research Institute (KEFRI) 
library situated at the main forest entrance provided a glimpse into how the PFM process 
developed, yet they do not reflect the level of involvement by different participants in the 
process. These documents included many of the reports developed from the 1998 Dida 
area PRA and workshops (discussed later in this chapter) used as the foundation of the 
PFM pilot project. For instance, during the 2001 workshop exploring subsistence use of 
the forest, contributors were listed as the following: 
Participants were drawn from the local community, provincial administration, 
local leaders, ASFMT members, project extension officers, officers from MoU 
secretariat, officers from headquarters of KEFRI, FD, NMK and KWS and 
officials from FADA (Kagombe & Mbuvi, 2001, pg. 2).  
There were 44 listed participants with 41 males and three females who were non-
representatives of local women1. While local women were not participants here, issues 
that concern female communities were discussed, such as gender disparities in 
community development representation, educational opportunities, and male dominance 
in most activities (Kagombe & Mbuvi, 2001). It is possible that participants are building 
on previous issues discussed by rural women in past workshops, such as the Dida area 
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PRA conducted as part of the PFM project where women were represented as a focus 
sub-group along with elders, middle-aged, and youth sub-groups (ASFMT, 1998).  
One possible reason for the absence of villager participation in the 2001 
subsistence use workshop was its location. For the Dida area PRA, the workshop was 
conducted locally at Dida Primary School, a centralized location on the southeast side of 
the forest and close to rural villages and relatively accessible to many villagers who 
cannot afford (by money and/or time) to travel. In contrast, the 2001 subsistence use 
workshop was held at Gede Ruins, a centralized location near the northeast side of the 
forest and accessible to non-villager participants due to its position next to the Malindi-
Mombasa highway. Gede Ruins is situated near the forest’s main entrance and 
headquarters for KFS (then the Forest Department), KWS, and KEFRI. While some 
representatives from Dida attended, the majority of villagers (whether invited or not) 
would find it financially or timely prohibitive. In interviews with villagers on the west 
side of the forest, some stated that travel to the east side of the forest (and the markets 
available there) was too expensive and took a prohibitive amount of when traveling by 
public transportation to and from their west-side villages2.  
Each workshop published its own report before or after the workshop took place. 
And while I was unable to remove these documents from the library, 33 of the documents 
were photographed using an iPad. Some workshop documents described the level of 
community involvement, such as the Dida area PRA (ASFMT, 1998). But most provided 
objectives, workshop development, and workshop results that formed the foundation of 
the Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Management Plan (ASFMT, 2002). The findings articulated 
in the documents were the basis for PFM implementation throughout Kenya. The 
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workshops consisted of the following: Biodiversity and Conservation, Commercial Use, 
Eco-tourism Management, Forest Protection, Human Resource Development, 
Infrastructure Development, Problem Animal Management, Zonation (Research and 
Monitoring3). Additional documents included analyses of beekeeping, guidelines on PFM, 
aloe growing, silviculture vs. livelihoods, woodcarving, and protection of community 
rights over traditional knowledge. 
However, it is the documents not located in the KEFRI library that reveal as much 
as the documents that were. The library is intended to be a repository of useful 
publications and reports not only by the parastatals, but also researchers and community 
members. Meeting minutes for the Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Management Team were 
included but were incomplete at the time of my visits to the library. In 2002, management 
team meetings for stakeholders were planned at one per month (A Rocha Kenya 
interview)4. According to the Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Management Team Operational 
Guide, meetings are to be held bi-monthly (ASFMT, 2005), yet the director of KEFRI 
stated that meetings were to be held every quarter and even that number has dropped to 
the occasional meeting (M.T.E. Mbuvi, personal communication, July 15, 2011). With a 
variance of interviews between two to twelve per year, this reflects the inconsistencies 
inherent in the de jure and institutionalized PFM process. The incomplete ASFMT 
minutes discuss ongoing issues, such as conservation initiatives, forest management, and 
enforcement. The contents of the available minutes correspond with interviews of 
adjacent dwellers on miscommunication between stakeholders and the ambiguity of both 
forest enforcement and stakeholder role responsibility in forest management.  
	   	   16 
In addition to meeting minutes, documents from foreign aid organizations and 
researchers of ecology (Oyugi et al., 2008; Bruisnma, 2008), policy and development 
(Collins, 2008; Schreckenberg & Luttrell, 2009), geography and anthropology (Walters et 
al., 2008), and other disciplines that frequent the forest and adjacent communities were 
almost entirely absent from the publicly accessible library. In contrast, these documents 
are readily available through academic English language journals not accessible to 
community members, yet KEFRI officials provided drafts of peer-reviewed journal 
articles that focused on the ASF and provided PFM to me. 
This absence of published documents corresponds with complaints by many of 
the people I visited. At the end of each interview, it was customary for me to ask the 
interviewees what they would like to add or questions they had for me. Many of them 
asked if they were ever going to see my report, who it was really for, and what is going to 
separate me from the many other foreign researchers who come in and extract 
information then disappear and use it for their own gain, sometimes returning to the field 
with a new title and greater power when those interviewed remain stagnant (West, 2006). 
Interviewees expected me to treat them as “objects of knowledge” (Watson & Till, 2009) 
by taking the information collected in interviews and offering nothing tangible in return. 
They expressed that many researchers are never heard from again, and while I cannot be 
certain that many of the researchers don’t submit their published papers to the library, it 
is apparent that some researchers fill the taker role implied by interviewees.  
The expectations between the researcher and those whom they interview or 
collaborate with in their research are important in analyzing the ability for conservation 
efforts or initiatives to succeed. The researcher expects the local populations to provide 
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honest answers to questions concerning topics related to their research or to follow 
expected protocols in data collection. Without this honesty or adherence to protocols, the 
intended way in which a researcher’s data is to be represented may be compromised. 
Local residents who participate in foreign research hold expectations that the information 
shared with the non-resident researcher or the data they helped collect or analyze will 
have a tangible effect on either conservation efforts in their area, changes in public policy, 
or measurable benefits to themselves or their communities. Each set of actors has a role 
they must fulfill, and each set of actors is dependent on the other to meet these 
responsibilities.  
  In some cases, it may be the parastatals and NGOs who do not submit published 
articles into local libraries or distribute them to stakeholders and community members on 
behalf of the researcher. After noticing the absence of peer-reviewed articles and 
documents, I followed up on my own published research article (Banks, et al., 2010) and 
non-published reports in affiliation with an NGO—neither were located in the library. In 
the summer of 2010, I worked with A Rocha Kenya and Friends of the Arabuko-Sokoke 
Forest (FoASF) on a joint forest monitoring pilot project that involved using GIS and 
community-based organizations to monitor forest resource use and to analyze the 
effectiveness of the Arabuko-Sokoke Schools and Eco-Tourism Scheme (ASSETS) 
educational bursary project managed by the UK-based Christian NGO, A Rocha Kenya. 
Permission to access the forest was given by both the KFS and KWS on condition I 
present a report to their offices upon completion. The report was to be written by me and 
then reviewed and edited by both A Rocha Kenya and FoASF. While the report was 
written and submitted that summer to A Rocha Kenya, FoASF did not receive the 
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report—nor were they able to make edits (despite the fact that a forest monitor from 
FoASF was listed as co-author). Due to the low priority placed on the submission of my 
report compared to the plethora of the NGO’s other tasks and responsibilities within local 
communities and their foreign donors, I was unable to fulfill my responsibilities to the 
parastatals. As A Rocha Kenya financially manages FoASF, the low priority assigned to 
the pilot project prevented the co-author of FoASF from providing feedback, preventing 
him from fulfilling his role as researcher.  
This reflects not only the dependencies between NGO, researcher, and parastatal 
roles, but also how the responsibilities of their roles are situated within their agendas. The 
researcher expects the NGO to fulfill its role of localized management since access to 
other stakeholders can be much harder to communicate with. The NGO expects the 
researcher to disseminate data or information that will increase exposure to the NGO’s 
agenda. This can bring in both much needed foreign revenue and more interest in the 
projects being worked on. The parastatals expect NGO and researchers alike to complete 
reports that the parastatals don’t have the manpower or resources to perform on their own 
accord. If there is a breakdown of role expectation and perception in this chain, it can 
impact the successfulness of conservation initiatives and breed a sense of—or actual—
project stagnation. 
The importance of collaboration between stakeholders is expressed in a KEFRI 
document describing its importance at the beginning of the PFM process: 
Dida [pilot project] shows that the PFM process can be very dependent on the key 
individuals and institutions involved in its planning. The collaboration between 
the various NGO and government institutions involved in supporting the process 
was very important during the initial phase. This case also highlights the 
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importance of having a signed contract and a sufficiently robust communication 
and arbitration mechanism to ensure that the community can lobby to have its 
rights enforced (Mbuvi, et al. 2010, pg. 8). 
At the parastatal offices near the main gate of ASF and households in the surrounding 
villages, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 15 individuals, eight focus 
groups were completed. Interview subjects were chosen using opportunistic sampling. 
Where availability was the largest factor, interview subject choice was based also on 
several other factors. For villagers, individuals were chosen if they resided within a short 
distance from the forest boundary and were accessible from the road that divides the 
forest from farms. Farms were chosen largely by visual assessment of financial stability. 
As the PFM Guidelines report indicates, “the poorest will be assisted through a jointly 
developed system” (Mbuvi et al., 2004), we approached adjacent dwellers’ farms if they 
appeared to not have income generating activities visible from the road. Villager 
interview subjects were also chosen through my research assistant using criteria chosen 
by me, such as specific representatives of those with alternative IGAs. Interviews were 
conducted on the farms. For representatives of parastatals, interviews were conducted on 
or near the property of the respective parastatal. For representatives of NGOs or 
conservation initiative representatives, these interviews were done informally—often at 
my residence. Most interviews lasted approximately one hour. 
Many of the focus group interviews relied on the snowball—or chain—sampling 
technique, where subjects are chosen based on network connections developed in the 
field (Hay, 2010). Owing to the fact that it was necessary for me to gain acceptance and 
approval for interviewing villagers at the local level, I visited all the area chiefs that 
govern the villages adjacent to the forest. These visits were unannounced and were 
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subject to the availability of the chief, which often required frequent contact attempts. 
The approval from the area chiefs is in addition to the permission granted by the Kenya 
Government in Nairobi, which I needed before meeting with the area chiefs. During these 
visits—which were not interviews—it became clear that some area chiefs were very 
interested in being a part of the research. Some chiefs felt it important to organize the 
interviews with community forest organizations (CFAs), as many chiefs stated that their 
access to the community organizations would streamline my research.  
Whether intentional or not, the active participation of chiefs in the research 
subject selection allowed the chief to exemplify their role of power within the community 
and their ability to maintain their position of power with an outsider. Maintaining a 
powerful role in the relationship with a researcher is important, since area chiefs are a 
gateway between foreign researchers and the community. Economically, chief-mediated 
relations and interactions between outsiders and the community can alleviate 
complications experienced by non-local researchers through an increase in accessibility 
to multiple groups within communities and a decrease in the amount of bureaucratic red 
tape inherent in access at the state level. This potentially more attractive, streamlined 
process could increase the likelihood of future longitudinal research or aid programs that 
not only benefits the community by exposure to aid but would also benefit the area chiefs 
by linking them to the access hierarchy of aid. 
In addition, several area chiefs preferred to be the mediator during the interviews 
with the focus groups they organized. Although I had a translator with me at all times 
during interviews, many group interviews were conducted with the area chief filling the 
role as translator and mediator. In these cases, I was instructed to sit next to the chief, and 
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my research assistant, David Ngala, was instructed to sit on the other side of him. This 
positioning of bodies illustrated the connection between the chief and me during the 
interview period. It isolated me from Ngala and made verbal contact with him next to 
impossible. If I attempted contact with Ngala during the interview, I would be insulting 
the chief, since it required me to look over the shoulder of the area chief and make eye 
contact with Ngala to confirm translations or non-verbal cues—an interview method that 
had become important in interviews where there was not a second mediator. Eye contact 
with Ngala provided me the opportunity to non-verbally communicate important strands 
of the interview to be either continued during the interview or to be analyzed in private 
afterwards. 
The presence of the area chief as mediator may also have affected interviewee 
responses. Conservation initiative subjects may have been steered toward issues that the 
chief-as-mediator would favor or feel passionate about. For example, in the case of the 
Jilore focus group, discussions turned to land ownership as being the largest drawback to 
conservation initiatives that would improve economic livelihoods (Jilore focus group, 
personal communication, August 23, 2011). In discussions with the area chief after the 
focus group interview, the chief told me this was a personal goal of his to ameliorate for 
his village, and that he was interested in me working with him to bring this to light 
through my eventual report.  
Yet it is impossible to know what the responses would have been without the 
chief’s mediation during the interview. In addition, the chief is a member of the village 
community, and without a clear understanding of his role outside of his official office, it 
is logical to assume that he shares similar frustrations to those of the community group 
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members he invited to participate in the focus group. This, in itself, is another concern. It 
is difficult to know if the community members who participated in the focus group are a 
good representation of other CFA members or handpicked by the chief to represent his 
concerns. CFAs are comprised of multiple groups that represent different income 
generating activities, and these different groups have meetings among themselves to 
further improve their livelihoods outside of the greater community forest association 
group members. Concerns over financial reimbursement, a history of tension between 
researchers and local community groups, as well as the ability to set aside precious time 
to participate in the focus group may all have played a role in the attendance composition. 
A benefit for having interviews mediated by the area chiefs manifested in the way 
in which questions asked were translated in a way best understood by the interviewees. 
According to Ngala, who was monitoring the translations and interviewee responses, the 
area-chiefs-as-mediators didn’t “color” responses through translations or provide false 
statements that the interview subjects did not intend (D. Ngala, personal communication, 
August 23, 2011). 
In addition to area chiefs influencing some focus groups, the choice of Ngala may 
also have played a role in responses by interviewees. Ngala has been involved in 
community-based conservation efforts for over twenty years. Before this, he was a driver 
for the Forest Department. His involvement with community-based organizations 
includes forest monitoring—both alone and with the KFS and KWS—which takes him all 
over the forest and most often through footpath entries connected to all the villages 
adjacent to the forest. His work with A Rocha Kenya, a Christian NGO focusing on bird 
conservation, has also made his name known throughout forest communities. When 
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talking with patrons not affiliated with conservation at a bar adjacent to the KWS and 
KFS headquarters, all patrons said that Ngala was associated with the government. This 
makes sense, as his office resides at KWS headquarters and his reports on forest activity 
are intended for the warden’s desk for both KWS and KFS. 
My connection with Ngala had its pros and cons in interviews. To interviewees 
with ties to conservation activity around the forest, it possibly added legitimacy for me as 
researcher, for he is widely respected and accomplished on conservation issues with 
many in those communities. His work with actors at multiple scales likely allowed 
interviewees a sense of trust in that my work may come back to the communities I work 
with and may have been more candid due to this. 
 In contrast, interviewees that don’t have ties to conservation issues (or were 
antagonistic to them) may have been more reserved in their answers about daily activities 
that may not be sanctioned because of his perceived organization affiliations. Activities 
such as unsanctioned forest access, resource removal, and criticisms of A Rocha Kenya 
or KWS (who he is more affiliated with than KFS) may have been due to this. 
Interviewees who did not claim to know who he was may or may not have been 
influenced by his age, as he is around 65. 
The language barrier is also a concern on how the information from my 
interviews was acquired. On account of my rudimentary working of Swahili, I was at the 
mercy of Ngala’s translations. Before interviews were conducted, Ngala and I negotiated 
the method in which the interviewees’ replies would be translated and repeated. This 
method called for the main theme of the interview to be translated. Initially, our 
negotiated methods called for each reply to be repeated verbatim, but this proved 
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ineffective and unrealistic due to 1) the interviewees talking amongst themselves (in the 
case of focus groups or two-person interviews), and 2) long explanations that Ngala did 
not retain during translation. This means that much of the information that was said by 
interviewees is lost due to the interviews not being recorded. A drawback to this method 
is that not only are the main themes acquired and notes taken, but the choices of what was 
“important” to relay back to me by Ngala was entirely subjective, for he would offer me 
information that he felt I desired most. Nuances or discussions between interviewees that 
might have led to very important research topics or approaches to issues will never be 
known. 
The manner in which Ngala translated conversations was another negotiated 
method in the interview process. Initially, questions to the interviewees would be 
verbatim due to the need for my questions to be answered in a manner that would be best 
representative of what I was trying to say. But in a manner similar to how area chiefs 
would reframe my questions that would make the most sense to the interviewees, Ngala 
would also add clarifications because my questions were often very simple and needed a 
localized context that I could not provide. 
The manner in which my interviews were conducted affects the information 
gathered, and a clear understanding of the needs of communities and stakeholders may be 
biased due to my own positionality in the interview process, as well as the positionality of 
my translators and mediators. Information gathered throughout the interview process may 
be biased towards what was perceived by what the interviewees felt I wanted to hear or 
what they needed me to hear to increase their access to revenue or aid streams. As I am a 
white foreigner, it is often anticipated that my presence can be such a conduit of aid. 
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Having either an official of administrative power or a representative of a parastatal may 
have shifted the answers to my questions in a way that would prevent me from acquiring 
a clearer understanding of how communities still access forest resources and the manner 
in which this access is prevented or allowed by other stakeholders.  
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1 The three women listed as participants are Dr. H. Oyieke of the National Museums of Kenya, Nairobi; 
Ann Robertson; Research Associate, National Museums of Kenya; and Jacklin Kiage, National 
Environmental Sectariat, Kilifi/Malindi. 
 
2 The difficulty of travel expenditures was not shared by some villagers living on the east side of ASF. 
When mentioning difficulties of travel for villagers on the west side of ASF, interviewees on the east side 
discounted this concept as nonsense.  
  
3 Zonation workshop was renamed “Research and Monitoring Workshop” and Eco-tourism Development 
was renamed “Ecotourism and Environmental Education Workshop” in the Arabuko-Sokoke Management 
Plan (2002). 
 
4 It is possible that Mr. Jackson of A Rocha Kenya was referring to the four Working Group meetings, 
which were assigned to meet monthly, and consisted of Rural Livelihood, Tourism and Education, Forest 
Management, and Research and Monitoring (ASFMT, 2005).	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CHAPTER III 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A system of conservation based solely on economic self-interest is hopelessly 
lopsided. It tends to ignore, and thus eventually to eliminate, many elements in the 
land community that lack commercial value, but that are (as far as we know) 
essential to its healthy functioning. It assumes, falsely, I think, that the economic 
parts of the biotic clock will function without the uneconomic parts. It tends to 
relegate to government many functions eventually too large, too complex, or too 
widely dispersed to be performed by government. – Aldo Leopold, The Land 
Ethic, 1949, pg. 214. 
 
Political Ecology 
Political ecology is not a new sub discipline of geography, as it has been evolving 
since the 1960’s and is an interdisciplinary, political economic approach to human 
societies and environmental issues (Boag, 2007). The importance of political ecology 
rose out of the need to fill a large gap in the discourse of human ecology. Robbins (2007) 
framed human ecology by stating, “humans would be seen as part of a larger system, 
controlled and propelled by universal forces, energy, nutrient flows, calories, and the 
material struggle for subsistence” (pg. 28-29). While not completely dismissing human 
ecology, political ecology incorporates a less-than-universal force of a modern political 
economic system that greatly affects the actions and reactions of humans and their 
interactions with the natural environment.    
Environmental debates outside of political ecology largely began after Aldo Leopold’s 
influential late forties land ethic essay in A Sand County Almanac. This essay would 
inspire a movement of decentralized nature conservation. Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring 
was also pivotal in increasing public awareness to environmental issues between the early 
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sixties and the late seventies after the resurgence of conservation movements in the 
United States and the establishment of foundational environmental laws under the Nixon 
Administration. While these two pivotal pieces of text were not part of the body of 
political ecology literature, they helped introduce issues of human-environment 
interactions to a large body of the population outside of academia. The quote by Aldo 
Leopold opening this chapter can be seen as an example of an environmental awareness 
and government management or control of nature legacy that political ecology helps to 
unpack. Leopold argued that land conservation regulated by government that treats land 
as a commodity—regardless of economic value—maintains and reinforces a mindset and 
practice of value-based interactions with the land instead of recognizing complex (and 
probably unknown) biotic interactions and benefits outside of a cash economy. While this 
view has been adopted by environmental advocates, deep ecologists, and environmental 
historians around the world, political ecology addresses not just the inherently complex 
interactions of the biosphere, but also the complex interactions between the biosphere, 
ethnosphere, and its complex political economic structures that influence how humans 
interact with the land and how “land ethics” are created, embraced, forgotten, ignored, or 
suppressed.  
Watts and Peet (2004) state that political ecology “seeks to understand the 
complex relations between Nature and Society through careful analysis of social forms of 
access and control over resources—with all their implications for environmental health 
and sustainable livelihoods” (pg. 3). By looking at social forms of access, not just to 
biophysical resources but also access to social, political, and economic capital (Ribot & 
Peluso, 2003), political ecology can play a key role in bringing to light issues that affect 
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both the local, regional, and global which can often get buried in politics of scale (Peet & 
Watts, 2004) or through power hegemony—both implicit and explicit. 
Walker (2005) argued that political ecology, as an interdisciplinary way to look at 
the relationships between human interactions with—and place within—the biophysical 
environment, has shifted more to the political side of the political and ecology spectrum. 
He reveals that changes in discourse within the field has identified as more environmental 
politics—with less of an ecological bent—and also as a field of study still firmly 
engaging both political and ecological disciplines which makes political ecology possibly 
more true to its title (Walker, 2005, pg. 73). However, this shift is perhaps more of an ebb 
and flow than a firm shift in political ecology’s paradigm and discourse. This thesis 
attempts to look at the biophysical environment as well as the human political influences 
on that environment. In this thesis, biophysical environments include plant and animal 
communities, ecosystem processes, and equilibrium and disturbance events.  
The following is an example of how two different geographic perspectives on 
space can be used in tandem with political ecology. Most forests in the world—and most 
ecosystems in general—are in a constant state of change that challenges the concept of a 
biophysical equilibrium. When referring to a hypothetical prairie in the United States, 
Brabbatin and Rossi (2012) illustrate the differences in how cultural geographers and 
biogeographers can perceive the same space in different ways. In Brabbatin and Rossi’s 
illustration, the biogeographer might succinctly observe that the prairie is “a resilient 
ecosystem whose current state is a site-dependent result of frequent disturbance and the 
current manifestation of changes and perturbations over a long history of flux” (2012, pg. 
275).  As the authors intended, this resilient ecosystem perspective infers more than the 
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hypothetical prairie. It represents most biotic environments, regardless of their 
proximities to human settlement, as many human influences on the environment are now 
global in scale. It can infer that most ecosystems are in a perpetual state of disturbance 
and recovery that challenges thresholds on both micro (e.g., individual plant and animal 
species) and macro levels (e.g., communities, ecosystems, and biomes). This disturbance 
and recovery occurs whether or not humans directly influence those environments. In a 
utilitarian sense, this perspective indicates equilibrium that might best be described as a 
state of flux in which the least number of biota reaches its threshold, or the least amount 
of change within that current manifestation. Therefore, this would result in a state of 
homeostasis or balance regardless of whether or not ecologists classify equilibrium as 
steady state, dynamic, disequilibrium (Brabbatin & Rossi, 2012, pg. 278), discordant 
harmonies, or new ecology (Botkin, 1990; Zimmerer, 1994; Zimmerer & Young, 1998).  
In contrast, the cultural geographer is stated as seeing a prairie that “embodies 
local discourses on ecological restoration and best-management practices, uncovers 
power dynamics within and between communities, and illustrates the value of the prairie 
landscape to livelihoods, regional identities, and people’s environmental imaginaries” 
(Brabbatin & Rossi, 2012, pg. 276). This perception sees the same space as not how an 
environmental space naturally reacts to disturbance and recovery events, but how space 
is represented, perceived, and utilized by the human element that interacts with that 
space. These perceptions manifest through the relationships between human individuals 
and communities existing around and within the space, the way in which communities 
utilize the space, and how that space is viewed and represented—as well as how humans 
are represented or identified because of that space.  
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If this cultural geographer was a political ecologist, they might see that to adopt 
“environmental theories that ignore the social and power relations often prevalent in 
development issues pertaining to the environment” (Boag, 2007, pg. 2) would be 
irresponsible and exclusive to the forces that affect the biophysical landscape. The 
dynamism inherent in environments seen by both the biogeographer and cultural 
geographer is great. And it is the coming together of these two perspectives—the joining 
which holds both views as equally valid—which is the political ecology lens used in this 
thesis. 
Croll and Parkin inadvertently illustrate the differences between a political ecological and 
cultural ecological lens in response to the publication of Our Common Future—also known as the 
Brundtland Report—by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED, 
1987) and the absences in the discourse it represented: 
“The very linkage between development and global politics and economics is 
detrimental to the environment: ‘the problems of initiating sustainable 
development alternatives are frequently undermined by the pursuit of illusory, and 
detrimental policies, whose origin lies in the North and in the relationship that is 
maintained between North and South’” (Redclift, 1987, pg. 22 as cited in Croll & 
Parkin, 1992, pg. 7).  
This political ecological approach is followed by Croll & Parkin in a second point 
unaddressed in the report that reflects more of a cultural ecological approach as “the 
relation between person and environment which rejects the previous ways in which the 
‘environment’ was usually regarded as located outside ourselves, as a space inhabited” 
(1992, pg. 7). 
	   	   31 
This thesis also addresses the issue of marginalization as an overall concept; At 
each scale of power in forest management, a group of actors or individuals is always 
marginalized. Almost as a rule, it is the marginalization of those with the least power. As 
the scale of power is increased, the number of groups or individuals who become 
marginalized increases. Therefore, the margin where these groups operate or exert their 
social or political power changes at each scale. As Robbins (2007) states, “marginal 
communities are those at the fringes of social power, with little bargaining strength in the 
market and little force in political processes” (pg. 77). Social marginalization manifests 
both in physical disempowerment and perceived disempowerment (Sasu, 2005), either by 
those who are disempowered or by those who benefit from their marginalization, which 
can significantly change actors’ perceptions of their the roles of others. Because of this 
multiscalar marginalization, this thesis not only focuses on communities who are 
generally considered marginalized, such as women, ethnic groups, tribal groups, or socio-
economic class (Robbins, 2007), but also communities who are marginalized within 
organizations that have more political or social capital than communities often considered 
marginalized.  
For instance, at a micro scale, marginalized communities include younger women 
who are not heads of their families and may be second wives to men of any age who are 
known and fill a role as poachers in their communities and therefore do not have 
representation in conservation decision-making because of this role. At a different scale, 
actors who have more political and/or social capital may also be considered marginalized 
or disempowered. These include employees of NGOs who are not fully involved in 
conservation decision-making or employees of parastatals who also don’t have a voice, 
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such as forest rangers ill equipped to monitor a forest outpost. They are on the margins of 
their organizations, and while affiliated with a more politically or socially influential 
organization—with perhaps direct power over resource access to more marginalized 
communities—they also have little bargaining strength. As one moves up the scale of 
power, a change in the amount of social or political capital of individuals and 
organization can be seen, as power hierarchies can exclude even parastatal wardens from 
direct political or social influences thus affecting the perceptions of their roles within 
communities both above and below them on the scale of power.  
Knowledge Categorization and Disparities of Power within Communities 
For success in community-based conservation, it is imperative that local 
communities are "connected to and knowledgeable about resources," and that when this is 
achieved, communities will be in the best position to manage them (Selfa & Endter-Wada 
2008, pg. 948). At the same time, the concepts of "connection to and being 
knowledgeable about" the forest and its resources may be as diverse as its communities, 
and access to that knowledge is not linear or equitable. Therefore, it might be possible to 
place knowledge around Arabuko-Sokoke in a few broad categories.  
In an analysis of the Kumbhalgarh Wildlife Sanctuary in Tajasthan, India, 
Robbins (2000) examines both state environmental knowledge and that of stakeholders 
around the sanctuary. By examining environmental knowledge, Robbins exposed 
different ways in which community members view the forest and its importance in use 
and conservation. Robbins found that interviewed community members fell within four 
"knowledge groups" (2000):  
1. famine forest of medicine and fodder 
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o knowledge of forest food types and medicines in time of seasonal hardship 
(largely women and landless community members; largest group of 
community members) 
o high level of distrust for authority and timber harvesters 
2. fodder forest of browse and graze 
o knowledge of the land best used for grazing livestock, seasonal patterns of 
plants and fodder (also women and members who use the forest year 
round) 
o distrust of illicit timber harvesters 
3. capital forest of wood and construction 
o knowledge of and access to markets and market values for forest timber 
species; view the forest as an outlet for capital (members with strong 
urban connections as well as lower-ranking foresters) 
o distrust of commons governance of the forest 
4. forest as tree cover; state knowledge 
o knowledge of Western perspectives of conservation and ecological 
benefits of preservation (educated members, foresters, and landholders) 
o see fuelwood extraction and poachers as the greatest threat to the forest; 
see "fortress" conservation as most beneficial 
Each knowledge group definition proposed by Robbins (2000) can also be ranked in 
order of magnitude to social and financial capital (4 being the highest). This ties in with 
decision-making power in respect to conservation and forest utilization. Therefore, it can 
be a useful tool to use as a scale for marginalization. This analysis can also be applied at 
ASF. The most marginalized community members would most likely fall within the 
"famine forest" and "fodder forest" categories, as their use of the forest is more dependent 
on the resources of the forest (including wildlife hunting) and bargaining power that 
Robbins (2007) includes in his definition. This bargaining power is far less than the 
groups placed higher on the scale. Community members who fall into the "capital forest" 
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or "tree cover" categories have more access to economic capital, formal education, and/or 
Western knowledge and use the forest much differently, as indicated in the generalized 
knowledge group description, and are most exposed to received wisdom—defined later in 
this chapter (Brockington & Homewood, 1996).  
For Arabuko-Sokoke, I include a fifth category of knowledge: "intrinsic forest 
and social capital." The "intrinsic forest" knowledge type includes community members 
who have knowledge of the intrinsic ecological benefits of the forest and the location of 
specific flora and fauna regardless of its market or monetary value. Those who fall within 
this knowledge group do not necessarily have a Western-formal education, but they likely 
have had frequent associations with Western perceptions of ecology, conservation, and 
perhaps forest management. The “intrinsic forest and social capital” group can be 
considered local ecologists with an extensive knowledge of local use and local 
nomenclature of flora and fauna, but most likely also has Linnaean taxonomic knowledge 
of key species. Common positions held by these community members are local 
forest/safari guides, NGO and CBO affiliates, and education administrators with close 
ties to local communities. This category most likely takes third place advancing "capital 
forest" to number four in order of power and influence in forest conservation policy. 
However, it should be noted that category placement is not static and could move up or 
down depending on the importance of their knowledge in the communities—and their 
social capital—as well as an increase/decrease in the hegemony of Western knowledge 
(including education) in dominating both conservation discourses and proliferation of 
unbridled tourism (Nyamweru & Kimaru, 2008; Parkin, 1991). All three examples 
illustrate how postcolonialism influences representations of knowledge. 
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This exposes the necessity of marginalized community members to be involved in 
forest management and forest conservation. The five types of knowledge listed above 
(four categorized by Robbins and one added) are equally important, and when looking at 
the power dynamics within the rankings of listed knowledge types, specific types take 
precedence over those that are not represented. In Robbins' Kumbhalgarh case study, the 
environmental knowledge and forest needs of marginalized community members were 
taken into consideration1 but were not taken at equal value as the knowledge and 
perspective of those with higher economic and social power (2000). Those with higher 
levels of decision-making power did not see the benefits of protecting specific types of 
knowledge in the same way because they themselves did not possess the perspectives that 
the alternative types of knowledge provided. In addition, five categories do not give full 
justice to the diversity of human knowledge and diversity of members within stakeholder 
communities. Without all types of knowledge being equally represented in the 
management process, outcomes in conservation benefit the agendas of stakeholders who 
have the most power. Additionally, those who fall within the knowledge groups is by no 
means fixed or negotiable—on the contrary. There are members in the higher levels of 
decision-making power that are knowledgeable in both Western and local environmental 
knowledge, value and promote alternative (e.g., local) types of forest knowledge, and 
attempt to influence others within their own group as well as the knowledge groups above 
and below them. The above knowledge structure built upon from Robbins (2000) 
illustrates how perspectives of environmental conservation differ within and between 
different scales of power. Hegemonies of postcolonialism greatly influences knowledge 
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production and perspectives of actor roles based on a history of received knowledge 
(Brockington & Homewood, 1996). 
Participatory Forest Management 
The concept of resource co-management in general—and forests in particular—that 
incorporates state and citizen participation has been around for decades and has changed 
in theory, practice, and terminology over the past fifteen years (Glasmeier & Farrigan, 
2005). State/citizen forest co-management has fallen under many titles, including (but not 
limited to) community-based conservation (Berkes, 2004), community-based natural 
resource management (McCall & Minang, 2005), community-based ecosystem 
management (Gray, et al. 2001), social forestry (Riddle, et al., 1995), sustainable forest 
management (Colfer, et al., 2001), collective forest management (Bahuguna, Luthra, & 
Rathor, 1994), joint forest management (Naik, 1997), community forestry (Charnley & 
Poe, 2007), and participatory forest management (ASFMT, 2002). Different perspectives 
exist on how co-management should be implemented to ensure it is equitable, 
sustainable, and structured for both biophysical and socio-economic successes, and it is 
the flexible nature of co-management policies that help separate it from traditional 
exclusionary, fortress conservation policies. 
 Colfer, et al. (2001) see a sustainable forest management model that is based on the 
six principles laid out by the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR, 1999, 
pg.17-33): 
• Principle 1: policy, planning, and institutional framework are conducive to 
sustainable forest management. 
• Principle 2: maintenance of ecosystem integrity. 
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• Principle 3: forest management maintains or enhances fair 
intergenerational access to resources and economic benefits. 
• Principle 4: concerned stakeholders have acknowledged rights and means 
to manage forests cooperatively and equitably. 
• Principle 5: the health of forest actors, cultures, and the forest is 
acceptable to all stakeholders. 
• Principle 6: yield and quality of forest goods and services are sustainable. 
These principles create a generic template for co-forest management schemes that 
are broken down into four categories: Principle 1=Policy; Principle 2=Ecology; 
Principles 3-5=Social; and Principle 6=Quality of Goods and Services (CIFOR, 
1999). Each of these principles has a plethora of criteria and indicators of success. 
The more that policy makers and community members unpack these principles, 
the more complex and unrealistic the package presented by CIFOR becomes to 
implement and monitor. This is especially relevant with initiatives operating on 
tight budgets with all stakeholders on board—something common in 
underdeveloped countries. However, the first two layers (principles and 
categories, respectively) are the general foundations for forest co-management 
objectives. With an increase of principles, categories, criteria, and indicators of 
success, increases in complexity developed through this convoluted 
environmental conservation discourse make initiatives look good in the drawing 
room in affluent countries, but implementation can help lead to confusion in the 
field as a more diverse set of actors participate.   
Gray, et al. (2001) call it “community-based ecosystem management” and 
emphasize this type of management policy as inherently place based, and 
incorporating the communities living within that place, and that these places are 
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not subjected to just the biophysical but also the social and economic—both a part 
of this holistic ecosystem (pg. 30). As with CIFOR (1999) and Colfer, et al. 
(2001), there are principles that govern this type of co-management: 
• Principle 1: the land is treated as part of the community. 
• Principle 2: land decisions are made through inclusive, open, and 
transparent community-based processes. 
• Principle 3: when benefits flow from the land to the greater community, 
they flow through local communities. 
• Principle 4: the community is acknowledged as part of the landscape. 
The principles provided by Gray, et al. (2001) are more generalized versions of 
the CIFOR (1999) principles, although this may be due to the holistic emphasis 
placed on the principles by Gray, et al. (2001). Yet CIFOR also includes similar 
principles with more of a focus on institutional policy (top down) and less on the 
community, place-based ethos (bottom up). 
 Charnley and Poe (2007) summarize the objectives of community forestry 
into three characteristics:  
• Characteristic 1: some degree of responsibility and authority for forest 
management is formally vested by the government in the local 
communities. 
• Characteristic 2: a central objective of forest management is to provide 
local communities with social and economic benefits from forests. 
• Characteristic 3: ecologically sustainable forest use is a central 
management goal, with forest communities taking some responsibility for 
maintaining and restoring forest health (pg. 303). 
The generality of these universal objectives seems appropriate to encompass the 
different approaches to co-management provided by the multitude of scholars.  
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 In Kenya, as in other underdeveloped countries such as India, Indonesia, 
and Nepal (Chhatre & Agrawal, 2008; Ribot, Agrawal & Larson, 2006), forest 
citizen responsibility to co-manage environmental resources is institutionalized, 
albeit with varying results. Kenya’s 2010 constitution states “every person has a 
duty to cooperate with state organs and other persons to protect and conserve the 
environment and ensure ecologically sustainable development and the use of 
natural resources” (Kenya 2010, 69(2)). The vagueness of which organizations 
each citizen is obligated to cooperate with is left open for “state organs” to be 
represented by Kenya’s many parastatals, such as KFS, KWS, NMK, and KEFRI, 
which are the main stakeholders charged with implementing and enforcing state 
environmental policies. In addition to “state organs,” “other persons” can include 
non-Kenyan affiliates, such as the plethora of non-governmental organizations 
that work with the parastatals in achieving environmental policies, as well as 
Kenyan and foreign researchers working in Kenya.  
 But while the Kenyan government considers it every citizen’s duty to 
“protect and conserve” the environment, those who wish to co-manage forests are 
required to register as an association with the Kenya government as required by 
the Societies Act (Kenya, 2004) and Forests Act (Kenya, 2005). A CFA can work 
with the parastatals in a number of capacities that are spelled out in the Forests 
Act (2005, 47-1): 
1. protect, conserve and manage such forest or part thereof pursuant to an 
approved management agreement entered into under this Act and the 
provisions of the management plan for the forest; 
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2. formulate and implement forest programmes consistent with the traditional 
forest user rights of the community concerned in accordance with 
sustainable use criteria; 
3. protect sacred groves and protected trees; 
4. assist the [Kenya Forest] Service in enforcing the provisions of this Act 
and any rules and regulations made pursuant thereto, in particular in 
relation to illegal harvesting of forest produce; 
5. with the approval of the Board enter into partnerships with other persons 
for the purposes of ensuring the efficient and sustainable conservation and 
management of forests; 
6. keep the [Kenya Forest] Service informed of any developments, changes, 
and occurrences within the forest which are critical for the conservation of 
biodiversity; 
7. help in fire fighting; and 
8. do any other act that is necessary for the efficient conservation and 
management of the forest. 
PFM is defined by the Kenya Forest Working Group (KFWG) as “a forest management 
approach, which deliberately involves the forest-adjacent communities and other 
stakeholders in management of forests within a framework, that contributes to 
community’s livelihoods”2 (KFWG, 2009, pg. 6). While these capacities stated in the 
Kenya Forests Act reflect citizen responsibility, there are no parameters—either explicit 
or implicit—that account for decentralization of power to local communities.  
Yet the decentralization of power is necessary for co-management to be 
successful (Ribot, Agrawal & Larson, 2006). The ambiguous nature of entering into 
partnerships with “other persons” stated in the fifth capacity does not reflect the 
decentralization of power and empowerment to the CFAs, although to maintain a CFA, 
there must be a constitution, management plan, and local governing body (KFWG, 2009). 
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 It can be assumed that the formation of CFAs by forest-adjacent communities is a 
large part of the necessary decentralization. CFA formation is a way for communities to 
become organized at the local level—and financially self-sufficient—that would provide 
adjacent communities the empowerment needed to participate in forest co-management. 
But communities who organize into CFAs are not automatically provided a consistent 
voice or role in PFM. Decisions on how the PFM process continues after initial formation 
and implementation is—for CFAs—largely out of reach.  
Important components of PFM are held within the power of execution by the state 
through firm legislation on how forests can be utilized. For instance, the PFM pilot 
project developed in Arabuko-Sokoke forest provides allowances for adjacent dwellers to 
non-commercially harvest timber in areas that are frequently monitored by CFAs for a 
determined quantity of desired species (ASFMT, 2002). Initial resource site surveys were 
conducted, and training was provided by NGO and parastatal officials on monitoring, 
enforcing, and timetables developed for further site surveys (DIFAAFA secretary, 
personal interview, August 1, 2011). But because of current state law, no timber products 
(esp. indigenous species) from forest reserves in Kenya can be harvested (Kenya Forests 
Act, 2005). Therefore, a major component of PFM in Arabuko-Sokoke is a non-starter, 
and while there are hopes from CFA members that a new administration in 2013 will 
allow sustainable harvesting of timber from forests, there is no certainty this will be 
addressed after a new administration takes office.  
 This is especially frustrating for CFA members due to the proliferation of illicit 
timber harvesting in Arabuko-Sokoke (DIFAAFA member, personal interview, August 1, 
2011) that provides livelihood to some communities but undermines the access regimes 
	   	   42 
established through the PFM framework. Access to forest timber through illicit ways is 
partially controlled by agreements made by KFS rangers who allow illicit harvesting of 
timber that ends up on trucks destined for the market in nearby villages and towns. With 
these types of illicit arrangements being made and the PFM process indefinitely stalled, 
CFAs are disempowered by the PFM process they help establish (or helped establish, in 
the case of Dida), while the incentive to receive payment by KFS rangers to harvest 
timber destined for nearby markets increases. State law prevents one type of income-
generating activity (institutionalized in state law), while encouraging a different type 
(prohibited by state law).  
Another key component of co-management success is the transparency of each step in 
the co-management process. Valencia, Riera, and Juncà (2012) state that to achieve 
greater transparency is through the sharing of learned knowledge throughout the entire 
step of what they termed “reflection-research-action-reflection” (pg. 45) between 
participating researchers, coordinators, and local communities. This highlights the 
flexibility needed for co-management to adapt to local conditions (Valencia, Riera, & 
Juncà, 2012). Without this shared knowledge, the “action” component cannot be achieved 
due to an imbalance in power relations between participants, as those who decide which 
actions/tasks need to be performed take on the role of manager and those who perform 
those tasks in effect take on the role of worker, making sure the task is implemented 
within the parameters assigned by the manager. Actions or tasks on the local end—
whether jointly agreed upon or not—may take much longer to implement due to the 
diversity of participating and non/participating communities who are affected by the 
tasks.  
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In contrast, the more structured hierarchy found in parastatal organizations or 
NGOs often allows for swifter decision-making and less footwork. The setting up of 
barazas in Kenya (periodic, local multi-community and multi-village gatherings) that 
includes diverse communities around large forests takes time to organize and perform. In 
locations where roads are poor and funds are short, the cost of attending frequent barazas 
may be unrealistic, and it can be easy to fall into manager/worker roles, especially since 
there are already unbalanced power relations between researcher, NGOs, and parastatals 
in connection with members of local communities who are not directly affiliated with 
actors with higher social, political, or economic capital. 
Access 
 One of the key factors of participatory resource management, including forest co-
management, is the issue of access. The control of access is important in addressing how 
successful resource management will be through the actions of all stakeholders involved 
in the process of both forest conservation and the flow of benefits received from IGAs. 
When historically looking at Common Pool Resources (CPR) in the core states, it was 
often considered important to privatize or centralize government control of a CPR. This is 
largely due to the perceived threat that the anonymity of individuals in an open-access 
space reduces the perceived moral obligation of each individual to refrain from taking 
only what was needed in relation to all other individuals who have (or potentially have) 
access to that CPR. This prevents each individual from monitoring their own access to 
the CPR and removes any de facto rules-of-use that regulates resource access—such as 
extraction—thus leading to resource depletion. In other words, without privatized or 
government control, each individual would maximize their CPR use in the belief that 
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others will do the same, i.e., no individual wishes to be taken for a “sucker” (Ostrom, 
Gardiner, & Walker, 1994, pg. 295). The former develops strict rules of access, thereby 
monitoring the quantity of the CPR and better avoids this situation and allows for a more 
sustainable output of the resource, (in)famously coined “The Tragedy of the Commons” 
by Garrett Hardin (1968). However, scholars have shown that user-controlled and 
regulated resources in a commons does not always lead to tragedy but instead can sustain 
the resource as long as the users of that resource have control of access through both de 
jure and de facto institutions in forest, water, and fisheries (Ostrom, 1990; St. Martin, 
2001). 
 Although literature and case studies show CPRs can be regulated and sustained 
without state control or privatization, it is significantly more difficult to achieve or switch 
over from previous forms of institutional structures. State-controlled resources are often 
considered “fortress conservation” (Berkes, 2004) regimes, where resources are owned 
by the state and monitored, regulated, and policed by parastatals under policies 
implemented by the state. Fortress conservation severely restricts access and often 
displaces indigenous people in order to maintain an imagined, Western ideal of an 
ecosystem through “received wisdom” (Brockington & Homewood, 1996). A famous 
example is the indigenous Maasai being removed from traditional grazing lands—a CPR 
through kinship access—and placed on group ranches that altered their pastoralist 
lifestyle to a lifestyle far more sedentary (Fratkin, 2001).  
 Received wisdom is defined as wisdom with “roots deep in the experience, 
economic policies, and political interests of governments and pressure groups and 
ultimately, in values strong in Western culture and collective consciousness” 
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(Brockington & Homewood, 1996, pg. 92) that highly influences environmental policy in 
developed countries. This shouldn’t necessarily be contrasted with traditional ecological 
knowledge, as this term is difficult to define and is not a static knowledge but a changing 
form of knowledge based on localized wisdom (Berkes, 1999). It can also be said that 
received wisdom is not static but is rather knowledge that influences traditional 
environmental knowledge more than the reverse. Environmental policies have been 
especially influenced in sub-Saharan Africa where colonial environmental policies were 
put in place before independence and maintained after independence due to received 
wisdom, the logic it provided, and the benefits that states could reap through tourism or 
other forms of core-affiliated economic benefits. These “nature without people” policies 
(Selfa & Endter-Wada, 2008, emphasis in original) are not only limited to sub-Saharan 
Africa, but are also in both the global north and elsewhere in the global south, such as the 
United States, Philippines, and India (Selfa & Endter-Wada, 2008; Robbins, et al., 2009). 
Yet displacement of indigenous peoples inherent in fortress conservation is an extreme 
form of restricted access. In many cases, access is negotiated in both de jure and de facto 
ways and include not only physically restricted access to a space, but also through social 
and economic access to spaces that are connected to space that is physically restricted 
(Ribot & Peluso, 2003). 
Dependency, Postcolonialism, and Perception of Roles 
 Dependency theory started to shift the discourse in world economic development 
theory in the 1970s. Dependency was largely seen as a structuralist model that Arghiri 
(1972), Frank (1972), and Wallerstein (1974) explored and combined with world systems 
theory championed by Wallerstein (Friedman & Wayne, 1977). World systems theory 
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showed a three-tiered (initially two-tiered) geographic model of economic exploitation 
and dependence through the core (metropolis or center), semi-periphery, and periphery 
(satellite) lens. This puts dependency on the global scale of state-state economies, trade 
agreements, and development strategies—including aid (Bhagwati, 1985). Scaling it 
down, Galtung (1971) incorporates the core-periphery dichotomy (or centre-periphery) 
spatial representation of world systems theory within states, thus hoping to address the 
plurality of socio-economic communities and places within state territorial boundaries. In 
addition to applying systems theory within states, Galtung also discusses a harmony that 
this relationship creates due to its economic benefits to each state, but that because of this 
relationship, imperialism is entrenched and inequalities increase between states and 
within states (Lewellen, 1995).  
 Dependency theory often focuses on international economic interrelatedness of 
political geography and political economic theory. Bringing dependency to a scale that 
incorporates the micro as well as the macro—and having economics be one facet instead 
of the driving force of dependency—is far less explored through dependency theory. 
Galtung (1971) addressed the interactions between core and periphery states beyond 
global economics by exploring communication, knowledge, social structures, and a small 
bit of the psychological effects in terms of dependence (pg. 87). As the number of states 
considered to move from the periphery to semi-periphery has increased since the 
framework was created, it is important to not adhere to a strict structuralist framework 
where states are immovable within the three-tiered structure. The totality of dependency 
theory is misleading in understanding global and local complexities, and using it to 
predict future economic outcomes or development is not useful. But including 
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dependency theory is necessary in understanding development between the three tiered 
economic and development brackets that world systems theory provides. It is also 
important to incorporate the agency of individual states and to incorporate the influence 
of actors—and sets of actors—at different scales. 
Postcolonial theory allows for exploration of actor influences and can more fully 
explore the interdependencies on less of a global political economy scale. Kapoor (2002) 
states that “dependency [theory] chooses a structuralist and socioeconomic perspective, 
seeing imperialism as tied to the unfolding of capitalism, whereas postcolonial theory 
favours a poststructuralist and cultural perspective, linking imperialism and agency to 
discourse and the politics of representation” (pg. 647). Kapoor (2002) also states that it is 
beneficial to look at both dependency and postcolonial perspectives to see their 
relatedness and differences. Peet and Hartwick (2009) explain it very well: 
Whereas structuralism saw transcendent systems lending significance to the 
individual (event or person), many poststructuralists wanted to return significance 
to the singular (event or person)—that is, something is not important because of 
its role in the larger scheme of things…it is just important in and of itself (pg. 
198). 
Combining components of structuralist and poststructuralist frameworks can accentuate 
each other and avoid moving to opposite extremes of global world systems—disregarding 
the importance of the local—or where the local becomes centralized and the importance 
of the national or global is disregarded (Hart, 2001). 
 Postcolonialism is more of a poststructuralist theory seen through the lens of 
Orientalism (Said, 1978). While still critical of imperialism and Western economic 
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hegemony (as a force, not a theory), Orientalism focuses more on the representations and 
cultural reinforcement or maintenance of Western superiority through hegemonic 
discourses presented in media, social relations, government decisions, donor aid, etc., and 
maintained through power relations of Western (core) and peripheral and semi-peripheral 
states. Received wisdom is a manifestation of postcolonialism, especially in Kenya, 
where legacies of institutional conservation schemes are rooted in the colonial-era 
manufacturing of wildness landscapes by the British Empire to represent an idealistic 
gaze of what should be preserved—or conserved—for the posterity of an affluent British 
citizenry beginning in the 1930s and peaking between the Fifties and Seventies (Beinhart 
& McKeown, 2009; Urry, 19903). Birch (1990) explores the concept of wildness through 
this imperialistic framework by presenting wildness as a simulation of wilderness that can 
be boxed, contained, and controlled through the perceptions of those within core states. 
By representing wildness in this fashion, Birch (1990) reveals that protected wilderness 
areas maintain an illusion of wildness through the formation of a much-desired otherness 
that needs to be controlled. By controlling Kenyan wilderness through the formation of 
parks and reserves, postcolonial hegemony maintains control over a former colony, and 
through tourism and the concept of wildness by a Western affluent citizenry, the 
importance of wilderness and in what manner it should be managed, represented, and 
conserved, is manifested through received wisdom.  
The importance of territoriality of states is not the focus in postcolonialism4, and 
for dependency theory “culture is not a factor” outside of political economy (Kapoor, 
2002). Instead, postcolonialism would most likely consider that state structures help 
reinforce hegemonic discourses by maintaining power dominance of states that were once 
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empires and held multiple colonies. It would also better address the expected roles that 
different stakeholders represent in relationships of power and identity—in their historical 
place within that colonial system—in addition to economic power. Postcolonialism also 
allows for a more localized analysis of how communities interact between each other and 
different scales of power. Therefore, when using both dependency and postcolonialism, it 
is helpful to think of it as a network of interdependencies. 
Interdependency draws on both dependency theory and postcolonialism theory, 
but also draws upon vertical and horizontal linkages presented by Berkes (2004). Vertical 
linkages are relationships between local communities and the multiple stakeholders that 
influence actions in conservation initiatives, such as PFM, whereas horizontal linkages 
are relationships between local communities (Berkes, 2004). Vertical and horizontal 
dynamics can be seen as power tensions through differences in economic, social, political, 
and cultural capital. Interdependencies are an inevitable result of multiple actors with 
multiple agendas working toward a common goal or goals.  
Many conservation initiatives share common traits with commerce, trade, and the 
many forms of development. This is, in large part, due the interconnectedness that 
modern globalization proliferates. Because of this, interdependence incorporates the local 
scale as well as regional, state, and multi-state or non-state organizations, such as 
multinational organizations and non-governmental organizations. The relationships 
between actors who operate within these interdependencies each has a role that the actor 
is defined (or assigned) to perform. Yet it is the perceived roles and identities of other 
actors who also operate within the interdependencies that can cause tension. 
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Actors who are interdependent upon one another for the accomplishment of a 
specific conservation goal most likely have different agendas, and hence different reasons 
for involvement in each initiative. Every actor has a level of power as well as a level of 
perceived power within the initiatives. Most of this perceived power comes from the roles 
that are perceived by other actors who are involved in the same initiative—or are within 
the network of interdependencies.  
The discrepancies between actor roles at multiple scales affects the development 
or conservation projects by looking at the perceived roles that actors are expected to 
perform, and without an understanding of the multiple roles actors often play within local 
development or conservation schemes, these programs can increase the likelihood of 
projects stalling or collapsing. In addition, the discrepancy between roles and perceptions 
of power cannot be a panacea that will sufficiently explain why specific conservation 
initiatives succeed or fail, as there are multiple causal influences that should be assessed, 
such as biophysical, demographic, economic, institutional, and other socio-political 
influences (Agrawal, 2006). Therefore, this thesis will illustrate through case studies how 
the interdependency web has a large influence on participatory forest management and 
conservation schemes around Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Reserve. 
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1 Most likely due to the large numbers of community members who have that knowledge and how 
marginalized perspectives on conservation and land use has been the spark of conflicts surrounding 
conservation planning (Robbins, 2000). 
 
2 The official nature of this document is somewhat ambiguous. There is a disclaimer on the title page that 
states “the views expressed in this publication are those of the Kenya Forest Working Group (KFWG) and 
contributors and do not necessarily reflect or represent the views of our donors or any governments.” The 
main non-financial contributor is the KFS, which is a parastatal of the Kenya government. D.K. Mbugua, 
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then director of the KFS, included a forward that states the “manual is prescriptive and adaptive. It should 
be used together with other legal documents and the PFM guidelines. It will be reviewed periodically as 
more experiences come in from the field” and states the objective of the CFA formation manual is to 
“provide PFM facilitators with required information for forming effective CFAs [and]…provide a national 
standard for CFA formation” (KFWS, 2009, pg. 3). The main financial supporters of the document were—
in order of acknowledged financial support—the Ford Foundation and USAID/Pact Kenya (pg. 4). The 
document’s legitimacy would appear to be non-binding yet prescriptive in CFA formation. Therefore, the 
government and KFS have given themselves a loophole in accountability for its contents’ adherence by 
local communities. It is also unclear if financial support by the Ford Foundation and USAID is longitudinal 
or if—like many other aid projects—the stated periodical review will be too far apart to be affective in 
adapting to stakeholder needs and concerns.  
 
3 Urry’s 1990 introduction of tourist gaze fits well here, although the use of “tourist” in this context 
encompasses the citizenry of the British Empire who experienced Kenya not only on pampered safaris, but 
also distantly in the form of postcards and posters advertising the colony and its industrial accomplishments, 
such as the Uganda Railway. It should be noted that gaze is limited in a non-physical way as Perkins & 
Thorns (2001) discuss the differences between gazing (e.g. advertisements and pampered safaris) and 
performing (e.g. hunting)—both were forms of tourism in Kenya. 
  
4 While postcolonialism doesn’t explore territoriality and sovereignty, dependency theory has analyzed how 
sovereignty has been used as a challenge to the imperialistic economic hierarchy that the core-periphery 
structure maintains (Blaney, 1996).	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CHAPTER IV 
STUDY SITE 
National Parks in Kenya 
The sizes of the national parks in Kenya vary greatly. National parks with large 
populations of wildlife are situated throughout Kenya, particularly Aberdare (715 km2), 
Meru (870 km2), Maasai Mara (1,510 km2), Sibiloi (1,570 km2), Tsavo East (11,747 km2), 
and Tsavo West (9,056 km2). These larger terrestrial parks are mainly in the west and 
central portion of Kenya and draw the majority of the over one million tourists each year 
(Kenya Ministry of Tourism, 2010). Each park draws in foreign visitors for different 
reasons and often has its own type of ecology and unique wildlife characteristic. For 
example, Meru contains less human traffic and more forest cover, whereas Tsavo East 
and Tsavo West savannahs host the “big five1” animals most desired—and perhaps best 
known—by safari tourists.  Tourism in Kenya has become one of the most dominant 
forms of revenue in the country and accounted for 11 percent of the nation's GDP in 2009 
and was projected to bring in nearly ksh.100 billion (~$1.2 billion2) that same year 
(Kenya Ministry of Tourism, 2010). However, there are numerous smaller national parks, 
national reserves, forest reserves, sacred groves (kayas), and sanctuaries throughout the 
state that are not as well known or frequented by the safari package tourists. On the coast, 
there is an absence of large parks and reserves, but two smaller terrestrial reserves, 
Arabuko-Sokoke (400 km2) and Shimba Hills (253 km2)3, are of significant importance 
due to their small size, ecological value, and home to a large number of endemic and 
threatened plant and wildlife species—especially birds (Muriithi & Kenyon, 2002; Luke 
& Maunder, 2007).  
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Kenya Forest Policy and Parastatal Restructuring 
The restructuring of how national parks and reserves are managed has been an 
ongoing process in Kenya. In 1984 and 1988, then president Daniel Arap Moi issued two 
directives that banned conversion of indigenous forests to plantations and banned the 
cutting of indigenous trees, respectively (Rodgers, 1993). During this period, the Wildlife 
Fund Trustees became a parastatal, and was branded the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) 
in 1985 with encouragement from the World Bank that would restructure the ministry—a 
frequent World Bank requirement of civil service reforms attached to structural 
adjustment funds (Seymour & Mugabe, 2000). In 1991, a memorandum of understanding 
(MoU) was established that brought the KWS and Forest Department into a joint-
management scheme intended to streamline management and monitoring of protected 
lands (Rogers, 1993). While this MoU coincided with an initial restructuring of Forest 
Department and forest policy under direction of the World Bank, restructuring focused 
more on plantation production than conservation (Seymour & Mugabe, 2000).  
In 1996 and 1997, the last structural adjustment scheme proposed for Kenya by 
the World Bank4 included possible implementation of an environmental-specific 
structural adjustment scheme that would support and improve on environmental policies 
laid out in the Policy Framework Paper released by the Kenya government: 
The World Bank presented the adjustment loan, the first and so far only one of its 
kind, as an instrument to leverage implementation of the environmental policy 
reform commitments articulated in the [National Environment Action Plan] and 
the [Policy Framework Papers]. The adjustment operation would target reforms in 
such key sectors as forestry, wildlife, and land management, and would address 
various fiscal and economic policies that generate incentives for environmental 
destruction (Seymour & Mugabe, 2000, pg. 118).  
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According to Seymour & Mugabe (2000), this proposal failed to be implemented due to 
NGO distrust of World Bank meddling, government employees concerned for what the 
adjustment would mean for their jobs, and an international reshuffling of World Bank 
employees.  
During the same period as the World Bank’s environmental structural adjustment 
proposal, the government and the KWS, Forest Department, KEFRI, and NMK 
parastatals were working with NGOs with funding from USAID and the EU to develop a 
pilot project for participatory forest management at the Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Reserve. 
If successful, the parastatals were hoping that the project would be a model for other 
forest co-management projects in the state, as well as be a model for East Africa. The 
pilot project was approved in 2002 after a four-year assessment period. The project’s go-
ahead by the Kenya government was three years before the Forests Act (2005) and eight 
years before the Kenya Constitution (2010) that institutionalized forest community co-
management policies. The Kenya government, its affiliates, and international 
conservation donors were attempting to create a model of co-management that would 
help define future state forest management policies without the help of World Bank loans 
riddled with strings attached.  
Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Reserve 
The Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Reserve (ASF) is a 416 km2  (41,600 ha) indigenous 
coastal forest in Kenya's Coast province. It is approximately 110 km north of Mombasa 
and is in both the Kilifi and Malindi districts. The northernmost point of the forest is 
3°12’11.19” S; 39°54’19.10” E. The southernmost point being 3°9’59.28” S; 
39°50’38.42 E, westernmost point being 3°20’00.62” S;  39°47’58.94 E, and the 
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easternmost point being 3°17’07.10 S; 39°59’38.90 E. Its highest elevation is Nyari Point 
at ~177 m. with the lowest point at ~15 m near the Indian Ocean5 (Map 1). 
 ASF is the largest indigenous coastal forest remaining in East Africa (ASFMT, 
2002) and was once a portion of a large indigenous forest that spread along the coast of 
Map 1. Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Reserve Topography (ASFMT, 2002). 	   W
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East Africa including Kenya, Tanzania, and northern Mozambique (Burgess, FitzGibbon 
& Clarke, 1996). Forest portions smaller than ASF still remain, such as Shimba Hills near 
the Tanzania-Kenya border, and are protected by the Kenya state. Prior to European 
colonialism, the ASF was divided into two forests: Arabuko to the north and Sokoke to 
the south. It is unclear when the forest was consolidated and renamed Arabuko-Sokoke. 
Historically, the forest was used by local populations—including Swahili and 
Mijikenda—for rubber, timber, meat, and foraged material prior to the migration of the 
Giriama from their kayas south of their current location and north/northwest of Mombasa 
(Brantley, 1982).  
Resource extraction continued as the Giriama settled around the forest, especially 
in Dida (Brantley, 1982), but their settlements extended up to Malindi (and at one time 
near the Sabaki River) and to the coast (McIntosh, 2011). Due to the migration of 
Giriama from their kayas, the ASF lacks sacred groves (or kayas) that are a traditional 
part of the Mijikenda conglomerate coastal ethnic group, although many kayas are still 
located to the south near Shimba Hills, and protected under state law. ASF was initially a 
location of timber extraction by adjacent forest dwellers, coastal Swahili merchants, and 
British colonial companies (Masese, 2001). In 1932, ASF was designated as a crown 
forest and later became a forest reserve in 1943, with additional forest being incorporated 
in 1968 and 1979 (ASFMT, 2002). ASF has a long history of being used for hardwood 
timber desirable for its resilience to insects, and was harvested for boatbuilding by the 
Swahili, as well as for its timber for homes, furniture, and building poles for the houses 
of local residents (Maundu & Tengnäs, 2005). These desired hardwood species were 
mainly Afzelia quanzensis, Brachyleana huillensis, and Manilkara zanzibarica, and 
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legally sanctioned sawmills bordering the villages of Dida to the southwest, Karacha to 
the east, and Arabuko to the northeast were established for their extraction and were 
active in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Masese, 2001). The presence of sawmills 
resulted in the near extinction of these hardwood species (Masese, 2001) and their 
subsequent lack of natural replenishment through unassisted propagation.  
The three above-mentioned species can still be found within ASF, yet A. 
quanzensis has been harvested to the point of near extinction (Masese, 2001), and if any 
are found by adjacent dwellers interested in timber removal, they will be marked and 
quickly harvested for both local use and for sale to local timber markets in the 
neighboring towns of Malindi, Watamu, and Kilifi (Ngala, personal interview, July 22, 
2010). On the other hand, B. huillensis appears to be far more plentiful than A. 
quanzensis and M. zanzibarica, but timber from B. huillensis found within ASF are 
usually smaller than the timber historically extracted by timber companies due to their 
continued desirability and extraction by adjacent dwellers before full maturity (Ngala, 
personal communication, July 16, 2011). Because of the scarcity of these three species, 
local villagers harvest other hardwood species that are more prevalent, although slightly 
less desirable. These include Manilkara sulcata (poles), Manilkara sansibarensis (timber 
and carvings), Mmahi (poles), Mfudzo (poles), Msokoke6 (poles), and Cynometra 
webberi (wood carvings7). 
The growth rates of these species is medium to slow, but there is no concentrated 
effort on the part of KFS or KEFRI to encourage villager-assisted propagation of these 
species (Chumani CFA member, interview, August 24, 2011); instead there is a strong 
push for the propagation of Casuarina equisetifolia—also financially supported by 
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Nature Kenya and other NGOs as an IGA, as it can reach maturity quickly (Maundu & 
Tengnäs, 2005). C. equisetifolia is a long-established species on the coast and is desirable 
for building poles in both local and regional markets (Maundu & Tengnäs, 2005). 
According to Maundu & Tengnäs (2005), C. equisetifolia also fixes nitrogen (thus 
be used for soil conservation and degraded land reclamation), is used for building posts 
(as opposed to roof poles), and is one of the world’s best species for fuelwood. None of 
these benefits or uses were mentioned by villagers with whom I interviewed and even ran 
contradictory to their views, as they professed C. equisetifolia could not be used as 
building posts due to the species being prone to termite damage (Girimacha tree planting 
group, personal interview, August 25, 2011; Ngala, personal interview, August 25, 2011). 
While it may be one of the best species for fuelwood, the market value of mature poles 
for building purposes may preclude its use as fuelwood where the legitimate licensing of 
one head load of fuelwood retrieved from native species within the forest may be more 
cost effective. The neighborhood residential market demand for fuelwood may be low 
due to the availability of forest-provided fuelwood. 
While the sawmills have long been removed, the footprints of their locations and 
the dirt roads used to extract the timber from the forest can still be seen. Overgrown with 
other indigenous trees and understory (i.e., below tree canopy), long-term soil 
compaction has prevented the unused roads from fully recovering. Fortunately, portions 
of these scars have been put to other uses. The old timber roads adjacent to Dida have 
taken on new use in forest conservation as sector boundaries in the PFM scheme 
implemented in 2001 (DIFAAFA secretary, personal interview, August 1, 2011). Other 
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overgrown roads are often used by the KFS and KWS for patrols and forest/wildlife 
maintenance, as well as by local guides who lead birdwatchers inside the forest.  
In 1977, ~43 km2 (~4,300 ha) became designated as a strict nature reserve and is situated 
in the north-central portion of ASF (ASFMT, 2002). ASF, as a whole, has four vegetation 
types: Brachystegia woodland, Cynometra woodland, Cynometra thicket, and mixed 
forest (Map 2).  
These vegetation types are named for overstory (tree canopy) influence over the 
understory habitat, although the difference between Cynometra woodland and Cynometra 
thicket is defined by the understory and water content. Cynometra woodland has an 
understory with a higher species richness and higher water content than the Cynometra 
thicket on the west side of ASF, and the Cynometra thicket is the only forest type that 
appears to extend into the adjacent farms outside of the elephant fence that sharply marks 
the forest’s boundary. Mixed forest is categorized as such due to its interface of habitat 
that includes both Cynometra and Brachystegia overstory. Soil types differ within the 
forest boundary, with the two main soil types being white sandy soils that drain easily 
and red lateritic soil (Burgess, FitzGibbon & Clarke, 1996). Brachystegia grows on the 
red lateritic soil while Cynometra grows on the white, sandy soil (Burgess, FitzGibbon & 
Clarke, 1996). Timber plantations including Eucalyptus spp. are also situated within the 
forest boundary, but exist on the outer parameter of the forest—predominantly in the 
northwest portion which are either adjacent to or near the Mombasa-Malindi highway. 
The plantations being near or easily accessible to the highway allow for reliable access to 
the timber contained within. Extraction is less affected by road destruction caused by 
rains and also benefits from the cost effectiveness of the plantations’ proximity to timber 
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markets which extend from northern Lamu near the Kenya-Somalia border to Mombasa 
in the south. 
Map 2. Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Reserve Vegetation (ASFMT, 2002).	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Most of ASF is surrounded by a wide road passable by two vehicles side-by-side 
that hugs the elephant fence, but a northeast portion—between the road and forest 
boundary—has a buffer of adjacent dweller homes. While this portion of larger road is 
separated from the forest, a small, single lane road runs along the fence boundary. On the 
east side of the forest, the road is an asphalt-paved highway (the only paved stretch of 
road that runs next to the forest) that runs along the coast from Lamu to Mombasa. 
There are 53 villages surrounding the forest, which are comprised mainly of 
subsistence farmers who reside adjacent to the forest, although only a few adjacent 
dwellers live immediately next to the elephant fence (Map 3).  
Subsistence farming constitutes a large number of crops and increasingly 
incorporate IGAs that have been introduced by NGOs and the Kenya state. These IGAs 
include beekeeping, butterfly farming (from butterflies retrieved from ASF8), chicken 
rearing, aloe farming, and small-scale agroforestry of exotic species—mainly Casuarina 
equisetifolia, but also including Eucalyptus camaldulensis (E. rostrata)—intended to 
reduce pressures from overharvest of indigenous trees within the forest. Not all village 
residents are farmers. Some villagers travel to the larger populated towns of Gede, Kilifi, 
Malindi, Timboni, and Watamu to work as wage laborers for Swahili, Arab, and 
European business owners, as well as ethnic Africans who come from upcountry and 
have more economic mobility than local residents (e.g., Kikuyu and Luo) (McIntosh, 
2009) but at a much smaller scale. The main ethnic group around ASF is Giriama. The 
Giriama are the largest ethnic group within the larger Mijikenda group. Mijikenda is 
comprised of seven ethnic groups that also live on the Kenyan coast and share similar 
language characteristics:  Duruma, Giriama, Jibama, Kambe, Kauma, Rabai, and Ribe. In 
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addition to the Mijikenda, there is a large resident population of Swahili and Banjuni in 
the neighboring towns of Malindi, Gede, and Watamu (ASFMT, 2002; Martin, 1973), 
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Map 3. Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Reserve Village Population Density, 
2007 (ASFMT, 2002). 	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with Gede and Timboni having a smaller Swahili population as these towns are not 
directly on the coast and make up more of a periphery to Watamu: a beach tourist 
destination since the late sixties (Martin, 1973). According to McIntosh (2009), the 
spatial separation between the Swahili and Giriama communities is common throughout 
the Kenya coast, with urban centers containing a relatively strong economic base 
populated by more prosperous Swahili (living in stone houses) and neighborhoods which 
skirt these centers being populated by Giriama (living in coral brick and mud thatch huts) 
who are often excluded from Swahili society due to religious and economic capital 
(McIntosh, 2009; Beckerleg, 1995). 
The forest is home to many endemic bird species as well as rare and endangered 
birds that draw in ecotourism revenue. These birds are sensitive to habitat disturbance 
including human and elephant disturbances (ASFMT, 2002). Some of the most famous of 
these endangered species (and those that draw many European tourists) are the birds 
Sokoke Scops Owl (Otus ireneae) and East Coast Akalat (Sheppardia gunning 
sokokensis); and the mammals Golden Rumped Elephant Shrew (Rhynchocyon 
chrysopygus) and Aders’ Duiker (Cephalophus adersi). The forest is also home to the 
Gambian Pouched Rat (Cricetomys gambianus). The latter three mammals are frequently 
trapped for meat, and their abundance is unknown9. When casually discussing this issue 
with both KWS officials and local naturalists, I learned that the numbers of the Aders’ 
Duiker and Gambian Rat may have been poached to the extent that their numbers may be 
below a reasonable recovery rate. There is no known study on the population of these 
three mammals in ASF, although the Gede station warden for KWS anticipates a 
population count on these and other species during the 2012/13 year. 
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Giriama and Swahili 
Prejudices and stereotyping is quite common between the two groups as well as 
upcountry ethnic groups. In casual conversations with Muslim Giriama and upcountry 
Kikuyu who work on the coast in Gede and Malindi, the Giriama were perceived as lazy, 
jealous, and spiteful who use hurtful magic to get revenge on those who are more 
successful than them—both Giriama and non-Giriama—thus leveling the social playing 
field. McIntosh (2009) documents the animosity between the two groups by highlighting 
a long history of income disparity and historical right to land on the coast.  As the 
Giriama have fewer avenues of economic mobility and animosity of outside ethnic 
groups, in part due to a history of subjugation through slavery and wage labor (McIntosh, 
2009; Beckerleg, 1995). A common stereotype of Swahili is that they are selfish and 
don’t share their wealth and successes with those who are not their immediate family or 
within their religious social group. The Swahili (and related Arabs in Malindi) were seen 
as “blood sucking” and consumers of the labor of those around them. 
The animosity between Giriama and Swahili is also evident in the perceptions of 
wealth and economic mobility that manifest in magic. When I was having a difficult time 
sleeping in my residence near the east side of the forest, I consulted a few Giriama about 
my dreams, which consisted of feelings of being watched and the privacy invasion of my 
hut. I was informed that it was most likely neighboring Giriama residents who were 
jealous not only of my social and economic mobility, but that of the owner of the land on 
which my hut was situated. The owner of the land, my host, was an economically 
successful Christian Giriama who worked all over Kenya in forest conservation and 
youth educational schemes aimed at alleviating pressures on forest resources. His land, 
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surrounded by a fence, had three huts (two coral brick huts and one mud thatch) in 
addition to his two-storey stone house lived in by his wife and children and cared for by 
wage-earning residents. This plot was in sharp contrast to the surrounding mud huts 
occupied by his neighbors. Non-neighboring Giriama who I consulted about my dreams 
informed me that these neighbors had most likely sent a jini to pester me when I resided 
on my hosts’ land because of envy (wivu). It has been documented that hurtful magic 
influenced by wivu “is directed primarily toward relatives, neighbors, coworkers, and 
friends with whom the [person who pays to have the magic performed] has ongoing face-
to-face encounters” with and “creates the most harm” (pg. 171). They also said that 
because the jini was of Muslim magic, it was necessary to place pig bones (provided to 
me by a Giriama in Gede) in each glassless window to prevent the jini from being able to 
enter my hut and disturbing my sleep. It is interesting to note the jini magic is not 
exclusive to Islam. Ciekawy (2001) explores the relationship between healing magic 
(uganga) and hurtful magic (ustai), with jini (or majini pl.) and states the most dangerous 
uses of utsai involve majini spirits.  
This story is used to illustrate perceived stereotypes between ethno-religious 
groups because the witchcraft identified as causing my sleeping issues was attributed to 
Muslim magic and not Giriama magic. Although it is unclear if the Giriama neighboring 
my hut were Muslim, I did note that the radio broadcasts played by my neighbors from 
their transistor radios each night during the month of Ramadan included the break of fast 
at dusk. According to McIntosh (2009), the jini narrative reveals “tensions between 
accumulation and reciprocity, and mobility and rootedness in land” (pg. 91). McIntosh 
(2009) goes on to explain that “jini narratives bespeak a complex separatism, reifying the 
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notion that Swahili and Arab privilege is not so much the result of effort as it is a windfall 
conferred by money gathering supernatural forces that are accessible only to Swahili and 
Arab Muslims (pg. 91).  
This explanation of the jini narrative by McIntosh (2009) would indicate that it is 
not only jealousy which my Giriama consultants indicated as the reason for my hut’s 
invasion of privacy (and loss of sleep), but also of the desire of those responsible of 
implementing the magic to take some of the social and economic mobility of the space 
occupied by my hosts and myself and redistribute it to those outside of that space. 
According to Ciekawy (2001), the definition of “those” differs, as McIntosh (2009) 
attributes it to people whom have influence or control of spaces restricted to Swahili and 
Arab ethnicities whereas my Giriama consultants attribute the Muslim magic to those 
who are Giriama and have less economic capital and mobility than neighboring Giriama 
who are more economically successful and with greater social mobility. This theme of 
animosity of “accumulation and reciprocity” is one that runs through the Dida area PFM 
case study in relation to access to economic and social capital and mobility, but instances 
of witchcraft (i.e., hurtful magic) influences have not been correlated to the case study’s 
animosity between communities (Schreckenberg & Luttrell, 2009; Dida resident, 
personal interview, August 26, 2011) nor explored by me in my interviews. The reason it 
was not explored may be due to the secretive nature of Giriama witchcraft and the illegal 
nature of its use. 
The Witchcraft Act (Laws of Kenya Cap. 67) that was established in 1925 and 
revised in 1962 is one of the earliest laws prohibiting traditional religious practices 
(Ciekawy, 1998), The Act proclaims the use of “harmful magic” illegal and gives local 
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chiefs the authority to discover and prosecute individuals accused of harmful witchcraft. 
This Act has resulted in an uneven manner to which individuals are discovered and 
prosecuted by local chiefs, as those who are investigated are more often in conflict with 
the interests of the chiefs and their friends (Ciekawy, 1998). This plays into the complex 
local de facto political structures that make up forest community relations. 
Forest Access 
After ASF became a forest reserve, forest access by adjacent communities was 
curbed. Until 2005, permits were issued for adjacent communities to non-commercially 
harvest timber. While permit issuance ended with the establishment of the Forests Act 
under the Kibaki administration, fuelwood permits are still allowed. Adjacent community 
members (mainly women) can travel to a KFS station to receive the monthly permit once 
ksh. 50 is paid upon issuance. The permit allows the bearer to retrieve one head load of 
fuelwood (i.e. non-living wood found among the leaf litter) per day from within the ASF 
boundary. While timber permits have been discontinued since 2005, one adjacent dweller 
claimed that permits were still issued in a de facto manner by the KFS station in Jilore if 
the adjacent dweller paid ksh.100 per bundle. This would highlight the complexity of 
access that goes beyond de jure law KFS rangers are paid to enforce. If it is suspected 
that timber has been illegally harvested from ASF, the Forests Act (2005) authorizes KFS 
officials to confiscate that timber, even if it means pulling built structures down to do so: 
50. (1) A forest officer may –  
a) demand from any person the production of an authority or license for any 
act done or committed by that person in a state, local authority or 
provisional forest, or in relation to any forest produce for which a license 
required under this Act or under any rules made thereunder; 
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b) require any person found within or without a state local authority or 
provisional forest who has in his possession any forest produce suspected 
to have come from such forests, to give an account of the manner in which 
he became possessed thereof, and, where the account given is not 
satisfactory, arrest and take such person before a magistrate; 
c) search any person suspected of having committed an offence under this 
Act or of being in possession of any forest produce in respect of which an 
offence has been committed, and arrest the person, seize and detain any 
baggage, package, parcel, conveyance, tent, hut or building under the 
control of that person or his agent or servant (Forests Act, 2005, 50(1)). 
 This process of confiscation happens frequently around ASF, and it is one of many 
tensions between KFS officials and adjacent communities (Sokoke elders, personal 
interview, August 25, 2011). While perpetrators are caught and product confiscated in the 
forest, all adjacent community members I spoke with claimed that those who were caught 
were also beaten before being brought before a magistrate. 
 These fortress conservation practices are written in tandem with PFM practices in 
the Forests Act (2005). Because fortress conservation is still enforced around the forest, 
adjacent dwellers are less likely to work with KFS officials in co-management strategies, 
as relations between the communities remain strained. When asked to which parties ASF 
belonged to, interviewed villagers unanimously said it belonged to KFS—not adjacent 
communities. This also maintains state control over possible PFM processes, where KFS 
and the state can recentralize a decentralized process that both the Kenya Constitution 
(2010) and Forests Act (2005) promote (Ribot, Agrawal, & Larson, 2006). 
 Tensions between adjacent communities and the KFS also manifest in other ways. 
An adjacent dweller in Jilore expressed his frustration that charcoal produced from wood 
outside of the forest boundary was confiscated by KFS rangers who claimed the charcoal 
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was produced from wood illicitly harvested from within the ASF boundary. Despite that, 
the type of wood on both sides of the boundary was identical and could not be absolutely 
identified as illicitly harvested10. This has led to adjacent dwellers being frustrated at the 
level of enforcement by KFS and the confiscation of their own, legally acquired property 
(Jilore villager, personal interview, August 23, 2011). 
 Timber is often illicitly harvested from ASF. While performing forest resource 
monitoring in July 2010, multiple bundles of harvested poles (Manilkara sulcata, Mfudzo, 
Mmahi, and Msokoke) were found by myself and my research assistant along trails on 
the east side of ASF within 3 km of the forest boundary. We saw approximately two-
dozen individuals hauling bundles out of ASF within a four-hour period. There are also 
de facto rules of access between harvesters, as indicated by warnings scrawled in the 
trail’s bare soil at crossroads indicating an encroachment of territory through threats and 
name calling. 
Illicit Harvesting and Hunting 
 Parastatals such as KFS operate on small budgets that affect the compliance level of 
forest rangers. When discussing this topic with a few KFS forest rangers working in ASF, 
they expressed grievances of budgetary constraints that increase their inability to 
effectively perform their jobs. For instance, on the east side of the forest, the Jilore ranger 
outpost does not have a vehicle necessary to effectively monitor forest use as part of their 
job description. The interviewed rangers also expressed frustration on the low amount of 
money they were paid to perform their jobs, and claimed it as insufficient. As a result of 
these constraints, the resources available to rangers at forest stations around the forest 
operate on their own, illicit terms to compensate for the resources not given to them due 
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to these constrained KFS budgets. This compensation includes offering unsanctioned 
licenses for small timber harvesting (Jilore villager, personal interview, August 23, 2011) 
or providing villagers money to harvest timber to be sold to commercial timber markets 
in larger towns, such as Kilifi, Malindi, or Gede (Ngala & Chumani CFA member, 
personal interviews, August 24, 2011). This commercial timber is most often used for 
woodcarving and building materials. During a visit to the bazaar in Malindi, which 
specializes in woodcarvings for tourists, I asked a Swahili fisherman and city guide 
where the wood for the carvings originated. Without him knowing my role as researcher 
(vs. leisure tourist), the fisherman quickly responded "Arabuko-Sokoke forest" (Malindi 
fisherman, personal communication, July 30, 2010). 
 While none of the rangers interviewed confessed to know of any rangers who 
supplement their incomes with this illicit activity, one interviewed stated that "when a 
ranger goes home, they take off the uniform and become their own person. What they do 
on their own time is up to them" (KFS ranger, personal interview, August 17, 2011).  
Illicit Harvesting Chain 
 The system for the illicit removal of timber from ASF is a de facto rules-of-use 
protocol involving a chain of merchants, foresters, and villagers and essentially following 
this pattern: 
1. The merchant places an order with a third party that is close to the forest rangers. 
2. The merchant and forest rangers agree upon the price.  
3. The forest rangers hire villagers to cut the number of timber and species desired by 
the merchants. A price is agreed on by the forest rangers and the villagers hired to 
cut the wood. 
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4. While the villagers are cutting the forest, the forest guards abstain from patrolling 
the area where they know the villagers are harvesting the timber.  
5. If the timber is cut and placed in bundles, the bundles are either set upright along 
the side of well-worn paths for easy removal or hidden in the brush a few meters 
off the trail. If they are posts, the posts are not bundled but are still propped 
upright against living trees.  
6. During an agreed upon date and time between the forest guard and harvester, a 
lorry is brought in to remove the timber. This is often done under the supervision 
of a forest guard and often at night. 
7. The harvested timber is then delivered to the merchant. 
In addition to this process, timber harvesters will sometimes set up camp within the forest 
where they will cut the timber into commercial lengths before it is hauled out. Harvesters 
will do this deep within the forest, including the nature reserve. 
 This type of corruption has been documented in other sub-Saharan forest 
communities such as Cameroon (Topa, et al., 2009). After government cuts in forest 
sector salaries—due to cuts in sector expenditures—resource use was altered in protected 
forests by rangers who controlled forest resource access:  
Declining salaries, poor working conditions, and the offer of very large sums of 
money provided a strong incentive for corruption. The average MINEF official 
earned CFAF 60,000 [$100] per month and had no means of transport or 
communication, but could gain millions of CFAF by not reporting logging in areas 
for which a company had no right (WRI 2000, pgs. 64-5 from Topa, et al., 2009, pg. 
19). 
The Cameroon case, while not entirely equivalent to the rangers’ predicament at ASF, 
does correspond with the complaints expressed by KFS rangers at ASF. 
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 Corruption does not operate in a vacuum, where the forest rangers are the only ones 
who benefit. While the level of risk incurred by forest rangers is higher than the risk 
incurred by villagers harvesting from the forest but lower than the merchants who are 
purchasing the timber, all three sets of actors benefit from this scheme. Because of the de 
facto agreement with KFS rangers in charge of patrolling that specific area, harvesters 
have a reduced risk of their illicit activity in the forest. During these harvesting events, 
villagers can "safely" remove timber for either their personal use or for market within the 
villages in addition to the quota requested by the merchant. Although the sum is 
undoubtedly small, harvesters get financially reimbursed for the wood that is cut and 
prepared for forest removal. This money can directly benefit their families, unlike the 
removal of timber for personal use. 
 One drawback to the harvester is the level of risk they face. Having KFS rangers 
look the other way while harvesting does not fully remove them from danger. Oft-armed 
KWS guards, tour guides, and CBO representatives frequently make unannounced tours 
of the forest. This most often takes the form of patrols, guiding bird watchers, or 
conducting snare and cut timber surveys, respectively. The time spent in front of a 
magistrate or any jail time could jeopardize positions of employment or informal 
economic arrangements.  
 
Notes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The “Big Five” was coined by European hunters and includes game considered to be the most difficult 
and hazardous to hunt on foot: African elephant (Loxodonta spp.), black rhinoceros (Diceros bicornis), 
Cape buffalo (Syncerus caffer), leopard (Panthera pardus), and lion (Panthera leo). 
 
2 These numbers should be taken with some apprehension. Sindiga (1999) claims that tourism revenue 
indicators and statistics are fluid and “notoriously inaccurate” (pg. 60). 
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3 Although the size of each forest is not uniformly documented, there are explanations for this. For Shimba 
Hills, Sindiga (1999) states it is 192 km2 whereas Knickerbocker & Waithaka (2005) put the size at 253 
km2 due to the inclusion of conjoining lands that include the Mwalunganje Elephant Sanctuary and Shimba 
Hills National Reserve. For Arabuko-Sokoke, the size is vastly different. Sindiga (1999) states it as 6 km2, 
which is in sharp contrast to most documented accounts of Arabuko-Sokoke being between 400 km2 and 
420 km2 (KWS, 2012). Sindiga (1999) is likely only including the nature reserve, established in 1977, and 
situated inside the northern portion of Arabuko-Sokoke forest. However, Sindiga assigns the year of 
gazettement of 1991—this date falls as the same year the Memorandum of Understanding was created 
bringing both the KWS and Forest Department under a national management role of protected lands (Oyugi, 
et al., 2008). 
 
4 According to Seymour & Mugabe (2000), Kenya was also the first sub-Saharan African state to receive a 
structural adjustment loan. 
 
5 Coordinates and elevation were estimated using Google Earth software. Oyugi (2008) puts the elevation 
between 60-135m but does not reveal how this was determined. 
 
6 The three species listed here: Mmahi; Mfudzo; and Msokoke, are local names for species where Ngala did 
not know the Linnaean name for them, and cross references in the exhaustive text by Maundu & Tengnäs 
(2005) likewise did not list these names. This may indicate their endemism to ASF. 
 
7 While the main use for C. webberi is woodcarvings, Ngala stated that this hardwood’s use as fuel was 
incredible. Interestingly, there were no signs of any remains from previously cut C. webberi being used for 
this purpose, as the only portion hauled away were those best for carving; The branches, shavings, and 
other portions of the tree were left at the cutting site. This was prevalent for all ages of the initial cut—from 
recent cuts to trees harvested months before. 
 
8 For a comprehensive description of this well-established project, see Gordon and Ayiemba (2003). 
Although still relatively successful compared with many other IGAs, a decrease in demand of ASF-
available pupae has reduced the economic prosperity once held by the project’s participants. According to 
some project participants, a change in management has also reduced the project’s effectiveness as an IGA. 
 
9 As of June 2012, there had not been a comprehensive wildlife inventory conducted, although the current 
warden for KFS seemed optimistic about this survey being conducted in the near future (Makosi, personal 
correspondence, June 5, 2012). 	  
10 When observing the property on which the adjacent dwellers shamba was situated, there were many 
locales where wood was being harvested for charcoal production. There was no indication that the wood 
was removed from within the ASF boundary, and due to the abundance of timber outside of the forest 
boundary suitable for charcoal, there is little reason to indicate the woodpiles were harvested illicitly. 
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CHAPTER V 
CASE STUDY 1: DIDA PFM 
The first case study examines the PFM pilot project situated in Dida on the 
southwestern corner of ASF. With a long history of conservation management and its 
fundamental role in the establishment of citizen-based associations around ASF, the 
dynamics surrounding this case study were foundational to this project. Large amounts of 
resources have been applied to PFM at Dida, and actors from all scales—from USAID to 
local Dida village officers—have been involved in making this project a success.  
While some aspects of the PFM project have been successful, the inability for 
movement on its completion is representative of how the project’s importance is 
perceived by different stakeholders and the power each stakeholder holds and chooses to 
use in this area of the Kenya coast.  
According to David Ngala (personal interview, July 11, 2011), village elders in 
Dida were among the first adjacent dwellers to call for the protection of ASF from farm 
encroachment through degazetted portions. How exactly the degazettement process was 
initiated is uncertain, but there are two perspectives. According to David Ngala, (personal 
interview, July 11, 2012), the process began with a 1993 degazettement proclamation by 
then president Daniel Arap Moi which would clear southeastern portions for new farms 
for squatters, as the land is owned by the Kenya government. With political influences in 
the region favoring such degazettement, an additional northeast portion was added to the 
proclamation. These two areas consisted of the original, large southeastern portion that 
bordered four sublocations: Chumani, Roka, Matsangoni, and Mkongani. The other 
addition bordered Mijomboni and Kakuyuni sublocations. This differs slightly with 
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Burgess, FitzGibbon, & Clarke (2000), who state the process started with a local MP 
proposing degazettment of 10 percent Brachystegia forest on the east side of the forest 
with the appearance of President Moi being an oppositional voice of degazettement. 
Regardless of how it was proposed, there was initial support from the elders. 
Degazettement was a desirable solution by many neighboring residents to 
alleviate pressures on existing farms from overpopulation that bordered ASF. The main 
pressure from overpopulation was due to an increase of family size on adjacent farms 
where traditional partible inheritance practices prevented current farms from sustaining 
those families. As with many partible inheritance practices around the world, male 
children would receive a parcel of land on the existent plot once that male married and 
began to have children. The oldest male would then take over the original plot once the 
father died. With multiple male children reaching adulthood, the portions of land that 
were allowed to be allotted would eventually become too small to support their growing 
families, and movement to other plots outside of plots controlled by the family would 
have to substitute.  
Yet there was opposition to degazettement. Ian Gordon, former director of 
Kipepeo Butterfly Farm and affiliate of Birdlife International; Barbara Simpson, a 
conservationist and owner of a beach guest house (later Mwamba Field Study Center 
operated by A Rocha Kenya); and Ann Robertson, a botanist from the National Museums 
of Kenya, encouraged local naturalists and tour guides to speak with villagers about the 
importance of preserving ASF for biodiversity and as a water source for both animals 
within the forest and the villages adjacent to it. The forest provides water to adjacent 
communities in two ways. One way is as water catchment basins within the forest that 
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wildlife, including elephants, use throughout the year. The other way is though 
evapotranspiration, as the presence of large amounts of vegetation releases water vapor 
into the atmosphere allowing for more precipitation. This is particularly important around 
the western and northern sides of ASF where water is far scarcer than around the eastern 
and southern sides.  
Because the electric fence intended to keep elephants from destroying crops and 
injuring residents had not yet been erected, this would have been a strong argument for 
the conservation of water sources within the forest. According to Jonathan Baya, a former 
A Rocha affiliate, and David Ngala, a local naturalist, tour guide, and conservationist, as 
well as my research assistant and translator, their efforts were successful in convincing 
the elders of the threats to the forest from farm encroachment as well as bringing the 
issue to light in the local newspaper (A Rocha Kenya, 2008; Ngala, personal interview, 
July 11, 2011; Ngala, 2009).  
While the portion of the forest under threat was on its eastern side and not 
bordering Dida, the village where the elders resided, Ngala believed that it was due to the 
media attention villagers received and the subsequent survey of threats to the forest that 
pressured president Moi to retract his proclamation of farm encroachment (personal 
interview, July 11, 2011). The success of local villagers led to the development of the 
Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Adjacent Dwellers Association (ASFADA) in 1996—that 
included Dida elder participation. ASFADA became an umbrella group to the many 
different registered associations around the forest. These associations include a diverse 
set of interests, and all are connected with IGAs for communities. This would later 
include the newly established CFAs that were part of the PFM pilot project and 
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subsequent management plan. This provided the parastatals access to different 
community groups without the high cost of traveling to their locations, which surrounded 
the entire forest boundary.  
The influence of ASFADA and role as a collective voice for the various 
associations adjacent to ASF has diminished over time. None of the Village Forest 
Development and Conservation Committees or community members asked about 
ASFADA could remember a time when the association made a visit to hear their 
concerns or represent them in any capacity—with the Dida Forest Adjacent Area Forest 
Association (DIFAAFA) representatives being the exception. It should be noted that 
DIFAAFA may have the greatest presence—and therefore ear—with the parastatals 
around ASF, and therefore would be the least vulnerable group that would need their 
voices represented. Consequent to the retraction of the degazzettement proposal, a more 
complete survey of threats to the forest and ways to alleviate these threats was undertaken.  
 In 1997, the biodiversity and forest threats survey was jointly funded by USAID 
(through Birdlife International), the EU, and the UK Department for International 
Development. The aim of the project was to develop a strategic management plan that 
would accomplish the following: 
• assess the threats on forest resources, such as trees and wildlife 
• address the needs and concerns of forest adjacent dwellers who depend on 
the forest for many resources 
• assess the ability to incorporate a participatory management framework 
that allows villagers to co-manage the forest 
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• develop a strategy that allows the forest to be sustainably used by a 
diverse set of stakeholders. 
The group of individuals who were to organize and implement the survey and 
management plan became the Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Management Team
1 (ASFMT). This group consisted of members of parastatal and government entities, such 
as KWS, the Forest Department (which became the KFS in 2005), NMK, and KEFRI. It 
also included individuals who were outside of these organizations but worked closely 
with the government representatives on conservation issues including Ian Gordon (project 
coordinator), Tsofa Mweni (education officer), and UK NGOs, including Birdlife 
International, and LTS International.  
 The process of developing the management plan began with a set of 15 
workshops that addressed the diversity of issues the forest and adjacent communities 
faced. These workshops were divided by “thematic areas”2: 
1. Biodiversity Conservation 
2. Commercial Use 
3. Ecotourism and Environmental Education 
4. Forest Protection 
5. Human Resource Development 
6. Infrastructure Development 
7. Problem Animal Management 
8. Subsistence Use 
9. Research and Monitoring (Zonation) 
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One additional workshop was monumental in the conservation schemes of ASF. In 1998, 
a participatory rural appraisal (PRA) was conducted in Dida, a southwestern sublocation 
that includes three larger villages: Dida, Kafistoni, and Kahingoni. The reason why the 
Dida sublocation was chosen differs depending on whom you talk to. One perspective 
came from a person who had a long connection to the PFM project, Washington Ayiemba. 
During the project’s initial development, Ayiemba was manager of Kipepeo (with 
affiliation to NMK) in Gede, but as of this writing works as a site support specialist at 
Nature Kenya in Nairobi. According to Ayiemba, the Dida location was chosen because 
of its diverse ethnic makeup, as it included not only Giriama (the largest ethnic group 
around ASF), but also Kamba and Luo ethnic groups.  The presence of Kamba was also 
listed as a small population in the 1998 PRA report, yet the report also mentions a small 
group of Kikuyu but no Luo. These three ethnic groups are not part of the coastal 
Mijikenda—like the Giriama—and are considered “upcountry” ethnic groups that share a 
similar language (kigikuyu) that is different from the language spoken by Giriama 
(kigiriama) and are concentrated near Nairobi (area accredited to the Kikuyu ethnic 
group) and the shores of Lake Victoria (Luo ethnic group), although Kamba are also 
located south of Mombasa (Lewis, 2009). When I asked David Ngala, a Dida resident, he 
claimed the location was chosen because the Dida elders’ active involvement in defeating 
the degazettement initiative increased their level of participation in ASFADA and they 
were able to argue for that area’s inclusion (personal interview, July 11, 2011).  
 For the PRA, the ASFMNT met with Dida communities about issues they faced in 
relation to the forest. These communities were divided into subgroups based on four 
“socio-cultural norms”: elders, middle aged, youth, and women3 (ASFMT, 1998, pg. 6). 
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It should be noted that addressing all inherent diversity within communities for the PRA 
would have been both temporally inefficient and impractical. For example, the PRA 
report identifies eleven Giriama clans in the Dida area. Because of diverse de facto 
intermarriage rules and identities that may form communities (Parkin, 1991) as well as 
the different socio-economic communities within the area, attempting to identify and 
address the plethora of communities in the Dida area would probably have delayed the 
completion of the PRA, therefore limiting its effectiveness in the eyes of the government 
and NGOs who were paying for the project. 
 Yet the subgroups chosen had different perceptions on what issues were the most 
important. These different issues were “prioritized and ranked according to the social and 
economic effects they had on the community” (ASFMT, 1998 pg. 14). Although there 
were marked differences of perceptions between the communities, the top two were 
almost unanimous. For instance, the elders considered inadequate clean water (for both 
humans and wildlife) as the most important issue, as villagers weren’t able to get enough 
water from their wells, and wild animals were venturing outside the forest looking for 
water (an earlier argument by the elders for forest conservation). The middle-aged men 
chose an inadequate water supply as being the most important due to shallow wells and 
attempts to dig new wells were destroyed by animals. The women felt human/wildlife 
conflict was most important, and this was tied to water issues. For the youth subgroup, it 
was low income that topped their list with water being second. When ranked, the two 
most important issues were water and the human/wildlife conflicts resulted when animals 
from the forest (predominantly elephants) ventured into farms looking for water (Table 1). 
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Before the elephant fence surrounded most of the forest boundary, there were 
frequent farm invasions by elephants, which are the most destructive non-human force in 
the forest. Most of ASF is accessible to the elephants, and as water became scarce, there 
was little villagers could do to prevent elephant invasions. One preventive measure of 
using chili peppers (Capsicum spp.) as a deterrent has been well documented (Parker & 
Osborn, 2006; Sitati & Walpole, 2006; Tennesen, 2006), but the practice is not widely 
known by villagers adjacent to ASF and certainly was not practiced before the fence.  
Yet there is some knowledge of using chili peppers as a deterrent. In 2004, a 
Kenya/Tanzania cross-border study involved 13 members of DIFAAFA, as well as 
representatives from the Forest Department, KEFRI, KWS, and Nature Kenya (Gichuki, 
Mbuvi, & Ayiemba, 2004). According to this study, there was a significant problem with 
elephant damage to crops in Garash village, Monduli District during the Tanzania visit, 
but the use of chili peppers as a deterrent was, at that time, “being developed” (Gichuki, 
Mbuvi, & Ayeimba, 2004, pg. 24). When I talked with members of DIFAAFA, one 
woman, who was part of the 2004 cross-border trip, stated that chili peppers eventually 
proved ineffective in Garash village (DIFAAFA member, personal interview August 1, 
2011).  
 One of the biggest accomplishments from both the PRA and subsequent ASF 
master plan was the establishment of the electric fence in 2006. Consisting of three 
strands of wire—with only the top two strands electrified—the fence prevents elephants 
from venturing outside of the forest boundary in search of water. This was a very 
welcome accomplishment, as Dida wasn’t the only area where elephant damage was a big 
concern. As of October 2012, the village of Malanga, located at the Northeast corner of 
	   	   82 
ASF, is the only location where the fence has not been completed, and wildlife/human 
conflicts along the ~5 km stretch of unfenced interface are still a concern for adjacent 
residents (Ngala, 2012). Although maintenance of the fence is ongoing and funds appear 
to be invested in its maintenance, a letter was sent by the CBO Friends of the Arabuko-
Sokoke Forest (FoASF) to the director of KFS in Nairobi on behalf of Malanga residents 
to press this issue (Ngala, 2012).  
Wildlife/human conflict is prevalent at many locations of forest/village interfaces. 
Further south along the coast, wildlife/human conflict is a major concern at the Shimba 
Hills ecosystem—the second largest protected coastal forest in Kenya. Shimba Hills is 
situated in Kwale District and is part of a larger network of land set aside for 
conservation:  Shimba Hills National Park, Mwaluganje Forest Reserve and Elephant 
Sanctuary, Mkongani North and West Forest Reserves, and the Golini and Mwaluganje 
Sanctuary—a 10 km corridor running through Shimba Hills and Mwaluganje Forest 
Reserve (Waiyaki & Bennun, 2000; Mburu et al., 2003). This conglomeration of 
protected areas is considered to be the Shimba Hills ecosystem and is jointly managed by 
KWS, KFS, and the Mwaluganje Elephant Sanctuary Committee (Knickerbocker & 
Waithaka, 2005).  
Shimba Hills differs from ASF in a few ways. The forests in and around Shimba 
Hills are highly fragmented into small patches surrounded by small farms. Threats to 
these fragments may be due to their size. With a higher boundary-to-area ratio, pressure 
on the forest edges would likely be higher compared to the larger protected areas of the 
Shimba Hills. Like the forest fragments, small farms surround the larger portion of the 
national park, and pressure from human development continues to erode forest 
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boundaries and the neighboring patchwork forests in large part due to farm expansion. 
There is evidence to show, however, that the forest may have been fragmented and 
dynamic before significant human population pressures due to their associations with 
kaya use (Nyamweru, et al., 2008).  
In addition to the forest’s fragmentation, the elephant population within the park 
is dangerously high. While many authorities feel that Shimba Hills can handle an 
elephant population count of ~200, periodic elephant counts have resulted in a population 
count ranging from 400 to 700 (Knickerbocker & Waithaka, 2005). This is in sharp 
contrast to the elephant population of ASF. According to a speculated population number 
provided by the warden of KWS in the summer of 2012, the elephant population of ASF 
was ~120. Comparing the population per km2, ASF has approximately 0.03 elephants per 
km2. At the Shimba Hills ecosystem, it would be a conservative 1.3 elephants per km2—
much higher than the carrying capacity of ~0.8 elephants per km2, according to 
authorities (Knickerbocker & Waithaka, 2005). 
Like villager concerns at ASF, elephant damage to crops and human lives had 
been a major issue. In 1994, a project funded by the World Bank (Knickerbocker & 
Waithaka, 2005) and overseen by KWS (Ombuor, 2009) began to erect a solar powered 
electric fence to keep elephants out of neighboring farmland and contain them within the 
boundaries of the forest reserve.  By 1999, the fence almost completely circled the 
Shimba Hills National Reserve, and human fatalities and crop damage from elephants 
dropped considerably from 18 human deaths between 1984 and 1999 to 2 deaths between 
1999 and 2005 (Knickerbocker & Waithaka, 2005). 
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Yet the fence was not a panacea to wildlife/human conflict4. For example, in both 
Shimba Hills and ASF, there has been a increase of crop-raiding monkeys who use the 
fence as a retreating point that placed them out of harms way of angry farmers, as well as 
pigs and baboons, as the size of the fence is not intended to prevent these smaller animals 
from venturing in and out of the forest boundaries (Knickerbocker & Waithaka, 2005; 
Sokoke elders, 2011 August 25).  
This is especially frustrating to villagers, as government compensation for 
wildlife damage is limited to death or dismemberment (Knickerbocker & Waithaka, 
2005), and does not cover direct costs of crop destruction, non-dismemberment from 
animal attacks, nor indirect costs such as fodder collection or time lost guarding crops. 
When an elephant invades a farm, the farmers and their families may have a chance to 
escape physically unharmed, but their crops and homes are stationary, so the chance of 
crop/home destruction doesn’t make the interactions between elephants and humans less 
conflicting. This reflects policies in other protected area interface boundaries in Uganda 
and India (Ogra, 2008; Adams & Infield, 2003). In addition, this adds to the animosity 
farmers have towards the parastatals (KWS) in charge of managing the wildlife. 
While the elephant fence—albeit incomplete—was a huge milestone in 
addressing concerns of the area, it was but one component of a much larger scheme. The 
main objective of the ASFMT was to develop a more complete forest management 
framework. This framework was outlined in the “Vision of Arabuko-Sokoke Forest in 
2025”: 
‘An intact and fully functioning forest ecosystem with no reduction in the 
existing forest area’ 
where… 
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• Local forest adjacent communities have opportunities to participate in 
meaningful way in the management of the forest, and as primary 
beneficiaries of its products and services. 
• The unique biodiversity of the forest is expressly conserved and 
enhanced through forest management interventions and actions. 
• Forest resource condition is developed and improved through 
management actions emphasizing the use of best practice and the best 
available information. 
• Environmental education and eco-tourism opportunities are enhanced 
for linking wider society with management of the forest. 
• Sufficient resources are made available to support an effective and 
motivated forest management team, enabling them to meet the 
challenge of this vision. (ASFMT 2002). 
In a nutshell, this vision looks to include adjacent communities in forest management, but 
at the same time acknowledges that adjacent communities may not necessarily see some 
of the benefits that international communities see: conservation of the forest for ecology’s 
or biodiversity’s sake. To achieve this—according to the ASFMT’s vision—adjacent 
communities would need to be educated on holistic conservation and its benefits whilst 
also allowing communities the opportunity to work in the eco-tourism service industry. 
The financial payback would include sustainable access to forest products, increased job 
opportunities, and a strongly supported parastatal base to implement and maintain the 
vision’s objectives—instead of becoming disgruntled by the paralysis of forest 
management that could otherwise lead to corruption.  
The largest component in achieving this somewhat vague and lofty vision is 
arguably the implementation of a PFM framework which allows adjacent communities 
the opportunity to participate in forest management along with the stakeholders put in 
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place to monitor and govern the process: KFS, KWS, and KEFRI (ASFMT, 2002). 
According to the management plan, the implementation of PFM around ASF would be 
accomplished by first establishing forest zones which would not only partition the entire 
forest into de jure use and access divisions, but would also incorporate an intervention 
zone that is comprised of an approximate 2.5 m buffer into adjacent community lands 
where IGAs, education, and participation would be focused. According to the zones, 
community participation (outside of eco-tourism employment) would not take place 
beyond 3 km from the forest/village boundary (considered subsistence zones or a non-
timber forest products zone). Plantations controlled by KEFRI would be limited to 
currently established plots on the north and east side. Past 3 km, the zones would only be 
comprised of eco-tourism and biodiversity zones. Revenue from eco-tourism would 
largely come by way of forest guides, which is governed by the Forest Guides 
Association and consists of local ecologists from surrounding villages. In the latter two 
zones, monitoring and enforcement would be conducted by KFS and KWS without direct, 
institutionalized community participation (Map 4).  
The participation zones would be considered the PFM areas, but PFM would be 
implemented in stages. The first stage would consist of a pilot project area located on the 
southeastern portion where the Dida sublocation borders the forest. This sublocation 
includes three villages: Kafitsoni, Dida, and Kahingoni5. A large portion of money was 
concentrated at this location. If successful, the second stage would include two other 
locations slated for PFM implementation: Kararacha and Kakuyuni-Mabuani 
sublocations. The Kararacha sublocation is located in the southeastern portion of ASF 
includes eight villages: Bora Upanga, Kambi ya Makaa, Kaoyeni West (Mkongo), 
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Matsanjeni, Mnazi Mmoja, Mpenda Kula, Nyongoro, and Sidzeni. The Kakuyuni-
Mabuani sublocation is located in the northeastern portion and also includes nine 
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Scheme (ASFMT, 2002). 	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villages: Magangani, Foro6, Mabuani, Mnazi Mmwenga, Mudzongoloni, Arabuko A, 
Arabuko B, Kakuyuni, and Kaliapapo A. In accordance with the Societies Act (2004), 
each of these groups would have their own constitution and management plan approved 
by the ASFMT and government in Nairobi (Kenya, 2004). While ASFADA remains an 
umbrella organization allowing for CFAs to have a single voice, the constitution and 
management plans of the three CFAs would be independent from ASFADA’s. Yet the 
three CFAs slated for PFM would most likely have very similar constitutions and 
management plans between them.  
CFAs are required in the Forests Act (2005) to adhere to the Societies Act (2004) 
in structure and governance instead of falling firmly within the Forests Act where the 
CFAs would be entirely under KFS control. This allows the CFAs to grow their 
membership base as they see fit, elect their own representatives/officers, and govern 
themselves up to the level where it interacts or conflicts with KFS, KWS, or KEFRI 
jurisdictions. The benefits to adhering to the Societies Act allow the CFAs the autonomy 
in developing their individual constitutions and managing their own treasuries7.  
It is important to note that while the CFAs would fall under the framework laid 
out in the Societies Act, ASFADA (also currently under the Societies Act) is attempting 
to switch gears and become a business. By becoming a business, ASFADA would then 
fall under the Companies Act (1978). The benefits to this, as told to me by the head of 
ASFADA, is that they would be allowed to control more ecotourism revenue through the 
renting/purchasing of land, as well as running bed and breakfasts adjacent to the forest. 
The setup of the pilot PFM zone at Dida was successful. This includes a site 
survey of tree resource availability, the establishment of forest management units (FMUs) 
	   	   89 
based on that site survey, and training villagers for joint patrols with KFS rangers to the 
whole PFM pilot project area. The establishment of the PFM zone was explained to me in 
2011 by DIFAAFA members and follows the subsequent procedures: 
The management team developed the zones with the participation of DIFAAFA. It 
was then revised with two men from the U.K., as well as representatives from KEFRI 
who examined the forest survey8. After the revision period, eight FMUs were established 
that are zoned to allow for non-commercial tree harvesting for poles.  These management 
units break up the PFM zone into manageable partitions. While some of the FMUs are 
identical in intended use, such as which species are abundant enough to be harvested 
sustainably, their division is based on existing road infrastructure. The PFM zone spans 
the entire length of the three villages of the Dida sublocation: Kafitzoni, Dida, and 
Kahingoni (Map 5). The zone is 42 km2 and encompasses all eight FMUs. The boundary 
is 14 km long and extends 3 km into the forest from the forest/village boundary (elephant 
fence).  
The PFM zones are as follows:  
• Biodiversity zone 
• Subsistence zone – fuel wood 
• Subsistence zone - poles 
• Monitoring zone 
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Corridors that are considered monitoring zones divide the subsistence zones, and all 
resource use within the monitoring zones is prohibited.  The monitoring zones are 
intended to act as a control to the adjacent subsistence zones. The intention of having two 
controls is for periodic resource surveys that may adjust the number of target species to 
be harvested in a negatively impacted FMU.  
The east-west partitions of the FMUs were chosen to follow preexisting roads that 
run perpendicular to each other and were originally used to haul brachylaena timber from 
the sawmills located within the forest in the 1940s. The roads are currently unused by 
automobiles, and are instead used by adjacent communities to travel into the PFM zone. 
They are considered paths more than roads, but the width of the old roads still remains 
Map 5. Dida Area PFM Land Use Implementation. Map Created by Dida 
Community Members. 	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due to soil compaction. Along these roads, trees painted with painted stripes to indicate 
the resources permitted for use within the different FMUs. The controls are marked with 
red for monitoring zones, yellow for usage clearance, and blue for the biodiversity zone. 
The end of the PFM zone 3 km inside the forest is marked with three colors: green, blue, 
and red. To divide the two usage zones of poles and fuelwood, yellow, blue, and red are 
used. The yellow indicates that the separation is between two usage zones. Colors are 
used because the majority of the adjacent residents are illiterate, although the letters 
“P.F.M.” can be seen along the Sokoke road to indicate its location. 
A resource survey, or forest assessment, was conducted within the subsistence 
zone over a three-month period between February and April in 1997. The purpose of this 
initial forest assessment was to identify specific tree species that were desirable by 
adjacent communities yet plentiful enough to be harvested in a sustainable way9. The 
identification of tree species was conducted using ten members of adjacent communities, 
including local tree experts, who did a sweep of the zones with a 2m buffer between each 
member. The forest assessment showed that healthy, desirable trees were too few for 
sustainable harvesting, yet there was an exception made for ceremonial cutting, such as 
burials.  
The management of the PFM framework is a joint venture that includes the 
members of DIFAAFA, KFS and KEFRI. Those who are allowed to participate in PFM 
and benefit from forest resources are residents who reside 5 km from the forest boundary 
(Mbuvi, et al., 2004). The parastatals consulted ASFADA as a representative of the many 
communities surrounding the forest. The Kenya Government, on recommendation of the 
ASFMT, approved implementation of the pilot project in 2002. Many stakeholders saw it 
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as the model for future PFM development throughout the state and the location where it 
was implemented is a site visited frequently by groups in Kenya, Tanzania, and persons 
affiliated with foreign aid organizations interested in the PFM process.  
Unfortunately, there is little progress on the Dida PFM project since its inception 
and implementation. Due to the moratorium on harvesting indigenous trees, the FMUs 
are not being utilized by the CFAs, and only adjacent communities have legally utilized 
the fuel wood zone. Zone partitioning has allowed fuel wood to be spatially regulated, but 
forest access for fuel wood was available to communities prior to partitioning. Therefore, 
there is little left to do but conduct area patrols by DIFAAFA members and KFS rangers. 
With this stagnation on the PFM process, little movement on the development of the 
CFA’s management plan and recruiting of community members into the CFA has taken 
place and has reversed in its effectiveness. DIFAAFA officials have expressed concern 
that due to the length of stagnation, many former members—initially enthusiastic about 
participatory development and willing to pay a membership fee—have dropped out of the 
CFA and used their funds elsewhere in the community. As a frequent stream of 
membership fees are required by the Societies Act to maintain the CFA, the feedback 
loop may jeopardize future community participation as fewer members are able to 
support the project.  
Interviewees from parastatals and NGOs who are close to the project—and have 
been since its inception and implementation—are also frustrated by its stagnation. 
According to Washington Ayiemba, a large reason for the stagnation is a continuous shift 
in personnel in the parastatals. The more shifts in leadership, the less excitement there is 
in the initiative (or initiatives, in a general sense). When leadership leaves for a different 
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post somewhere in Kenya, much of the knowledge they have about that project or 
initiative goes with them. This has been the case with the PFM project at Dida. Once the 
financial support for the project dried up and parastatals were expected to use existing 
resources to maintain the project’s momentum and development, it became another 
development project in a long list of development projects, and many of those 
development projects had current funding—thus more momentum. The more leadership 
rotation takes place, the less likely it is to be understood and/or addressed.  
If there is a dying interest from once-involved community members, there are 
subsequently less funds for communal support locally for the association to continue. If 
there are fewer funds, those who have initially been trained at the local level to further 
educate community members struggle to support their own IGAs, much less take time to 
travel and educate others on IGA production. Without large government funds to support 
projects that are institutionalized, the meager financial support that parastatals operate on 
cannot continue to give the project their full support, as they look to newer conservation 
initiatives that have financial backing from NGOs or the government officers in Nairobi.  
At the time of field interviews in July 2011, most of the IGAs approved by the 
state had been implemented at Dida, but community access to timber within forest 
boundaries and joint forest management was stalled with anticipation that a new 
administration in 2013 will remove this statewide restriction10. This has placed greater 
pressure on foreign donors to help support IGAs while allowing consistent CFA 
participation in general management with local parastatal administrators to be delayed 
indefinitely. Community representation through CFA administrators is subject to 
criticism, as there appears to be a disproportionate distribution of access to IGAs that 
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favor the administrators themselves—who are the first contact point for incoming 
conservation schemes (Koech et al., 2009). While there are some societies/associations 
that have operated in Kenya with the main purpose of acquiring foreign aid (Friedberg & 
Goldstein, 2011), those who operate as the main conduit to aid in the Dida CFA do not 
appear to be this sort.   
The roles between actors in the Dida PFM pilot project can be difficult to 
understand and assign. Each actor that represents an organization in the ASFMT has a 
different agenda and perceived role not only in the administration of PFM, but also in the 
administration of ASF as a whole. The Kenyan government has assigned the ASFMT to 
implement joint-forest management at ASF through the implementation of the strategic 
plan approved in 2001. This, in turn, causes the Nairobi representatives at the parastatal 
head offices to expect their in-field officers to manage the forest in a de jure fashion and 
not a de facto one—including enforcement. 
The CFA officials in Dida see the role of the parastatals as enforcers of de jure 
forest access and resource use. In turn, the parastatals expect the CFA to maintain the 
CFA’s participation—including joint enforcement—in return. In addition, they have 
different roles at different times, and this changes the expectations from other actors, both 
horizontally and vertically linked. For example, Dida CFA members need KFS to 
contribute their role of forest management and enforcement as articulated in the Forest 
Act. This is important because they feel that their own role in the PFM process depends 
on KFS representatives upholding their end of the bargain. Without KFS upholding the 
perceived role of those within the Dida CFA, members imagine the process collapsing 
due to unenforced forest access and resource extraction, non-equitable actions on training 
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and participation, etc. KFS requires that the CFAs role is to perpetually co-enforce 
partitions of the forest (FMUs) and continue to educate and recruit community members 
that may illicitly use the forest for resources. 
Since Dida is still used as a model for PFM success within the East African region, 
parastatal officials, mainly Mr. Mbuvi from KEFRI, perceive the role of CFA officials to 
present the project as a success and continue to promote, defend, and implement their 
CFA management plan. CFA members are expected to give an example of what has been 
accomplished, why it has been accomplished in the manner it has (e.g. FMU color 
coding), and promote its successes. With multiple partners and stakeholders from states 
within sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, and Asia visiting Dida to see how the project has 
been implemented, Dida CFA members believe the PFM project is becoming only a 
façade for development instead of an actual example of rural participatory development. 
While the CFA has felt they continue to live up to this role, they also seem to feel 
that the ASFMT role (as KFS and KEFRI are a part of) of fighting to have the project 
move forward is not being upheld; This, they have told me, can be accomplished by 
efforts as difficult as pressuring head offices in Nairobi to simple gestures such as 
providing the CFA with payment for tours/visits for foreign stakeholders and proceeds 
from video materials created with the CFA’s participation (Dida CFA members, personal 
interview, August 29, 2011). 
ASFMNT members see a part of the CFAs role to be one that goes beyond the 
physical management of ASF. Conservation education of non-CFA affiliated community 
members is a strong component of the overall PFM agenda. As with many conservation 
management education schemes, a few community members are trained—often in a 
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centralized, distant locale where others can be trained in tandem—on IGA techniques, 
such as aloe harvesting, agroforestry, and beekeeping. The cost of these education 
programs is covered by funds that are part of an overall conservation initiative-funding 
package. In the case of ASF, these costs were largely covered by USAID and Nature 
Kenya during the PFM pilot project and by A Rocha Kenya (via foreign donors and 
ecotourism revenue) through their ongoing ASSETS11 program. While these education 
sessions are often successful in training the few that are chosen to participate, the success 
of those few returning and educating those within their communities are less successful. 
In some cases, those who were trained expect to be reimbursed for work lost by training 
other community members, both within their own villages and in villages adjacent to 
them. Without this payment, the perceived roles and responsibilities between actors 
collapses, and the intention of the program stalls or collapses as well. Without addressing 
role expectations as a vital component, a select few benefit from external conservation 
education through received knowledge (and, arguably, received wisdom) as well as future 
access flows, such as social, economic, and education access flows. 
Representatives of the state expect the parastatals and communities to adhere to 
de jure joint-forest management policies written in state documents, yet both parastatals 
and CFA communities cannot carry out these policies unless all state mandates are both 
enforceable and clearly written. Conservation NGOs need the parastatals to protect the 
forest through enforcement—either through traditional exclusionary practices or joint-
management techniques—but also expect forest-adjacent communities to uphold the 
PFM framework agreed upon during the pilot project.  
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1 Also called Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Management and Conservation Team, but the acronym ASFMT is 
still used. 
 
2 In the proceedings document of the Zonation Workshop (2001), four workshops are listed in addition to 
the eight listed here. Additional workshops listed in the 2001 zonation document include “Illegal Activities,” 
“Policy, Legal,” “Environmental Profile,” and “Crosscutting Themes.” While some of these topics are 
frequently covered in other workshops and in the finalized 2002 management plan, there are no records in 
the KEFRI library (the depository for these documents) nor are there references to these workshops taking 
place in other documents. 
 
3 It is unclear in the PRA report whether women were included in the elder and youth groups or if all 
women (regardless of age or social status) were placed in one group. If this was the case, a 3:1 ratio 
imbalance may have affected the priority ranking, as well as affecting the women’s subgroup as there 
would undoubtedly be multiple communities within the umbrella “norm.” 
 
4 In the six years following the fence's completion, human homestead establishment around Shimba Hills 
increased by 36% near the fence as community members felt safer closer to the reserve. 
 
5 The order of villages in each CFA is listed spatially and not alphabetically or hierarchically. This spatial 
order runs from south to north. 
 
6 Foro village is not listed on the PFM map in the office of the warden of KWS as being part of the 
Kakuyuni-Mabuani PFM area, but this may be an oversight. The village boundaries that fall within PFM 
areas on the office map are not shown, yet it is the only village that seems to have been excluded. I have 
included Foro village due to its listing on the “population density surrounding Arabuko-Sokoke Forest” 
map found in the ASF management plan (ASFMT, 2002, pg. 5). It is possible that there are political 
reasons that Foro is not listed as it may have been joined with either Magangani or Mabuani. 
 
7 The autonomy to manage their own treasuries is a curse and a blessing for small societies around ASF. 
Membership numbers fluctuate (decreasing more often than increasing) as the society matures. This means 
that the collection of monthly fees and saved funds fluctuate and decrease as well. Because of the nature of 
the societies helping out fellow members when they are financially in need, using saved funds can deplete 
the treasuries or not be reimbursed due to members unable to pay. This limits the funds with which the 
societies can accomplish aspects of conservation initiatives that they would like to. In this case, it may be 
beneficial to have a transparent centralized location where funds are stored, such as a bank account 
managed by the umbrella group ASFADA. This would bring in a party that is not directly involved within 
the community where pressures of fund distribution would be prevalent. While there may be positives to 
this method, there may be more drawbacks than benefits. Access to funds by society members would be 
difficult as the nearest bank is in Malindi approximately 20 km from the forest. Coordinating with CFA 
members and ASFADA officers may be ridiculously difficult. Therefore, treasury funds would not be 
available to community members for common local tasks affiliated with the association. In addition, there 
are trust issues between CFA members and ASFADA. Mismanagement of funds may be perceived whether 
or not there is evidence of mismanagement. Mismanagement may also be the differences in perspective of 
entitlement and how the funds should be spent. For instance, when talking with the head of ASFADA, he 
expressed frustration that due to his role as chairman, he was not provided with a new motorcycle using 
ASFADA funds. He was frustrated that he had to use his own motorcycle for village visits, and the wear 
and tear these travels accrued was impractical. Contrary to this view, almost all villagers I discussed 
ASFADA with had not seen or heard of ASFADA representatives visiting them, although some did not 
know if ASFADA visited area chiefs. Therefore the spending of ASFADA funds on a new motorcycle may 
not be thought of as important to those who collect the CFA funds. This is just one case where interviewed 
community members question the level to which ASFADA represents adjacent dwellers and their interests. 
 
8 I am unsure what these revisions were. 
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9 It is unclear what the disturbance criteria used during the 1997 forest assessment, such as canopy cover, 
understory diversity, biodiversity/species richness, or habitat impact on avifauna. 	  
10 It is difficult to gauge whether or not the results of the 2013 national election will have an impact that the 
majority of the coast desires. Uruhu Kenyatta, the elected president, was not popular in the Coast Province 
(e.g. Malindi constituency gave Kenyatta 17% of the vote and Odinga 83%). In a post-election analysis 
article, Justin Willis, professor of history at Durham University, believed that decentralization of power 
given to provinces and newly-created counties does not have allies in the incoming President (Kenyatta) or 
the Deputy President (Ruto) (Willis, 2013). Willis stated that Ruto opposed the constitution and Kenyatta 
was “ambivalent” about it, which will likely increase coastal dissatisfaction in the way land and 
environmental policies are interpreted and enforced (Willis, 2013). 
 
11 ASSETS intends to use the bulk of the funds needed to sustain the education program, but due to the low 
amount of ecotourism funds generated in A Rocha in ASF, most of the funds come from foreign donors 
providing funds specifically with ASSETS in mind or from A Rocha’s own money streams that were not 
initially intended to support the education program. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CASE STUDY 2: NGAMANI ANTI-BUSHMEAT PROJECT 
The second case study examines an anti-bushmeat initiative situated in Ngamani 
village on the northwestern corner of ASF. Ngamani village falls within the Malanga 
sublocation. The Germany-based NGO, Nature and Biodiversity Conservation Union 
(NABU) financially sponsored the anti-bushmeat initiative. NABU worked in 
conjunction with Nature Kenya, an NGO that is based in Nairobi but with local 
representatives who work on an initiative-by-initiative basis.  
 According to Nature Kenya’s then-project representative, Patrick Sirya, and 
members of the Malanga Anti-bushmeat Group1, the project began as an initiative to 
reduce pressure on the proliferation of illicit small animal hunting within the boundaries 
of ASF. Due to the infrequency of small mammal sightings within the forest and the large 
number of discovered snares in every portion of ASF, conservation organizations, KFS 
officials, and NMK officials consider it to be a serious issue facing the forest. According 
to NABU’s website, their objective in Kenya is to support “long-term conservation of 
nature with innovative ideas in co-operation with local partners2” (NABU, pg. 1). Yet 
while NABU’s website proclaims they have “created an all-encompassing programme to 
reduce poverty in the communities around the Arabuko-Sokoke Forest by helping the 
local population to help themselves” (NABU, pg. 1), the only initiative that might be part 
of this “all-encompassing programme” discussed or mentioned to me by Nature Kenya or 
Ngamani residents was the anti-bushmeat project, although their official website also 
states their program includes “breeding butterflies, bee-keeping, mushroom cultivation, 
tree nurseries and ecotourism” (NABU, pg. 1).   
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 According to Sirya and Ngamani community members, the anti-bushmeat project 
would attempt to develop alternatives to animal snaring and tree cutting in ASF by 
educating adjacent communities about different types of animals that could be raised 
domestically and either used or sold for protein, dairy products, or live animals. In order 
to benefit from conservation initiatives, community members wishing to work with 
NGOs must register with Kenya social services, similar to the requirements of CFAs. In 
2009, the Malanga Anti-bushmeat Group registered as an ASF Wildlife Conservation 
Group and opened up a bank account. Three villager groups were part of the larger 
Malanga group: Ziani, Ngamani, and Kisimani3. In total, there were eight groups (each 
consisting of 15 members) part of the initial project and divided into four sublocations in 
different parts of the ASF boundary: Malanga (NW), Dida (SW), Mida (NE), and 
Matsangoni (SE).  
 The project performed its own PRA that identified the needs of community 
members—including the hunters themselves—who were part of the participating groups. 
The results of the PRA identified which species of animals each group felt would best 
succeed in their specific environment and which would lead to group members being 
trained in rearing that species. Group members included those who were taking part in 
illicit snaring activities, but only Dida had a group (one of three) that consisted entirely of 
poachers4. After many discussions as part of the PRA, it was decided that Malanga 
desired guineafowl (Numidida spp.)5 whereas Dida desired goats (Somali or small East 
African spp.6).  
 Because of the project’s small budget, only Malanga would actually be eligible 
for funds by NABU through Nature Kenya, and only the village of Ngamani would 
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eventually receive any funds. It therefore became a pilot project for the greater anti-
bushmeat project which meant the energy, time, and resources community members in 
other areas spent on the PRA was for naught. Guineafowl were the ideal choice for the 
Malanga area for two reasons explained by Ngamani group members: guineafowl are 
more resistant to disease due to their native status to the region and they are more 
desirable by community members in the market. Unfortunately, after attempts to acquire 
guineafowl, Nature Kenya and the Ngamani group were told by KWS they could not 
raise guineafowl due to the species being listed as wildlife by the Kenya government and 
therefore needed a permit—something the group was unable to afford. Incidentally, the 
crested guineafowl, the most common type domesticated in Kenya, is listed by the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) as being of “least concern” on 
the Red List of Threatened Species scale of wildlife (IUCN, 2012). 
 In lieu of guineafowl, the Ngamani group was given chickens to rear, but 
chickens were not considered a positive option due to the species’ high disease rate. 
NABU supplied the funds to pay for 35 chickens, but the construction of coops were the 
responsibility of Ngamani villagers. While there were originally 20 members in 2009, 
collecting enough funds to build the coop was not feasible. Friends of the Arabuko-
Sokoke Forest (FoASF), in collaboration with KFS, supplied the building materials for 
the coop. The materials largely came from confiscated timber illicitly harvested from 
ASF and cached at the various forest stations around the forest. 
 Within a month—the villagers gave the exact date of June 16, 2010—disease 
struck the 35 chickens, and all perished except five. While NABU promised to send one 
member from each group to a veterinary specialist to be trained, this didn’t happen. 
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Group members attempted to contact NABU after the majority of the chickens died, but 
because NABU visits to the community were very rare, the timeliness of the issue passed. 
During the time of the interview, it had been eight months since the group had been in 
contact with a NABU representative. When asked if the group had confronted NABU or 
Nature Kenya about why NABU failed to keep their promise of full group member 
veterinary education and follow up, group members claimed they had not asked. Instead, 
group members explained that the pilot project had obviously collapsed. To prevent the 
remainder of the chickens from dying, the constant upkeep of the mud and pole coop is 
necessary to maintain a healthy environment from disease and predators. Unfortunately, 
the coop fell into disarray after the 30 chickens perished from kideri, a type of fowl 
typhoid (Danda et al., 2010), due to the inability to pay for the upkeep using funds from 
the sale of eggs or chickens.  
Because of their initial excitement over the project, group members claimed they 
would continue to contact NABU in an attempt to start fresh with new chickens and new 
funds, but they felt this was not going to happen. Instead, the group was eager to find a 
different donor to help with starting the project again. But no donor has shown interest or 
come forth. As a result, some members have lost interest in the income-generating or 
protein-generating scheme and have returned to the forest to snare animals in the forest, 
which the project had been so enthusiastic to curb. Instead of domesticated chickens, 
community members were collecting suni, bushback, forest pigs, elephant shrews, and 
duikers. And while the remaining members of the group is encouraged by the increase of 
two chickens and three out of the seven now breeding, it is not enough to convince 
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community members that the time and energy needed for chicken rearing is beneficial as 
an IGA. 
 That isn’t to say the group members are not collecting funds. The remaining 
members are still dedicated to collecting ksh. 50 per group member per month. Yet only a 
fraction of this revenue goes toward chicken rearing. The group members are all too 
aware that more food for chickens means more eggs and plumper chickens, but the little 
money they are able to raise goes to Casuarina tree nursery planting instead of chicken 
rearing due to the reliability and establishment of the latter as an IGA.  
 The money spent on Casuarina planting goes to buy seeds from KEFRI, building 
the nurseries, plastic tubes needed for the seedlings, a 10L3 water tank, and a watering 
can. Yet it is the water that consumes the most money for maintaining a nursery. 
According to the region, a jerrycan of water (20L) costs ksh. 3, which can water 500 
seedling packets once out of the two times needed each day. Therefore, 500 seedlings 
need ksh6 per day. This can be a significant amount if each month it takes ~ksh. 186, 
which is the equivalent of four group member’s monthly contribution) to water a tree that 
will take at least THREE YEARS (equivalent to ~3 meters) before it is commercially 
valuable.  
While it is difficult to gauge the number of group members who are in poverty, it 
is wise to assume the monthly contribution required for membership is difficult to 
achieve for most members. The difficulty to pay is common throughout conservation 
groups bordering ASF. One reason it is difficult to maintain enough membership revenue 
is the lack of consistency in membership fees collected. This problem is not isolated to 
those who paid membership fees then found the program to be unsuccessful or not useful 
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and subsequently left the group. It is also a major component of successful groups who 
have some members with a diverse IGA outlet of income. When looking at poverty in 
Kenya, it is necessary to look at both generated income as well as consumption needs 
(Suri et al., 2008). Many members must use funds that were slated to cover membership 
fees on an incredibly diverse number of needs, from secondary school uniforms and 
supplies to the ever-increasing cost of maize flour7 (Kenya’s dietary staple) to fresh water. 
A reduction in crop production due to sustained drought in the region has compounded 
financial issues that adjacent community members face.  
Again, we can see the importance that perceptions of actor roles have in this study. 
There are horizontal linkages between community groups, such as poachers, membership 
participants, and non-participating community members, and anti-bushmeat groups from 
other villages. Each of these community groups interacts in relation to this conservation 
initiative, as poachers, non-participating community members, and anti-bushmeat groups 
from other villages look to the membership participants to demonstrate the feasibility of 
the IGA. The membership participants, in turn, look to the poachers to participate in the 
group to maximize the project’s effectiveness. By looking to these groups in turn, they 
are projecting their views on each other’s role. It would be naïve to believe that these 
groups are homogeneous or are the only groups influencing each other’s actions. Each 
member has agency and acts through that agency both inside and outside of the group.  
Vertical linkages can also be examined. NABU and Nature Kenya look to the 
group members and poachers to adhere to the requirements of their membership 
responsibilities, such as maintaining a treasury, collecting membership fees, utilizing 
funds in a manner that represents the expectations of NABU (i.e., on chickens and coop 
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building), and influencing various community members on the benefits of the 
conservation initiative (by way of making the initiative successful via sustainability). 
Nature Kenya also expects poachers and group members to utilize the conservation 
initiative, and FoASF expects the initial donation of poles from KWS will be used to 
construct a chicken coop and continue to maintain it. Because it is the responsibility of 
KWS to patrol and protect wildlife in ASF, they rely on the roles of NABU and Nature 
Kenya to further educate adjacent communities on alternative forms of protein and 
promote small animal rearing/husbandry as an IGA. The government of Kenya relies on 
NABU, Nature Kenya, and KWS to fulfill a role in which it cannot fulfill itself, mainly 
education on conservation and IGAs.  
In turn, Ngamani group expects the role of NABU to adhere to the promises they 
make. They also see NABU’s role as being one that should continue to fund a project and 
see its logical successful end. In the case of Ngamani’s chickens, this logical successful 
end would be the survival of the chickens (for a much longer period than one month), the 
knowledge and ability for group members to administer medicines for disease, and the 
successful breeding of chickens with initial revenue needed for coop upkeep and possible 
expansion of the IGA base. 
Yet there are also horizontal linkages on the scale of the NGOs. Because NABU 
operates out of Germany and relies on Nature Kenya to implement the project at ASF, 
they expect sufficient communication between Nature Kenya, NABU, and the 
participating communities to spend the designated funds and be transparent in issues that 
would become obstacles in NABU’s objective: “reduce poverty in the communities 
around the Arabuko-Sokoke Forest by helping the local population to help themselves” 
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(NABU, pg. 1). If the anti-bushmeat project is a major component of NABU’s “all-
encompassing programme” around ASF, its success would be fundamental due to it being 
the only IGA that substitutes protein sources instead of relying on money earned through 
markets (e.g. beekeeping, butterfly farming, and tree nurseries). Yet according to group 
members, the project was left hanging and allowed to collapse due to a break in 
communication caused by a change in Nature Kenya’s field representative.  
Interestingly, the Ngamani group does not attribute this break in communication 
to Nature Kenya but with NABU. Therefore, a change from a Nature Kenya 
representative who was an active proponent of the project to a representative who no 
longer makes frequent visits to the groups it helped establish —thus not a proponent—is 
a direct fault of NABU’s role responsibilities. The Ngamani group sees it as broken 
promises by NABU. The group then looks for either NABU to start the project anew or 
for the group to secure a new financial donor to continue the abandoned NABU (and 
Nature Kenya) project or fund a new project.  
The manner in which the Ngamani group calmly spoke of different NGO coming 
in to pick up where NABU left off with funds and connections further illustrates the 
interdependencies involved in conservation initiatives. While it shows how rural 
communities have become accustomed to NGOs and researchers that provide access to 
social, economic, and political capital and access, it also reflects the base state of many 
groups interested in conservation. Many rural areas are impoverished to the point that any 
change in investments is often an unrealistic expectation from NGOs who implement 
these conservation initiatives. The frequent flood of aid coming into rural communities 
from conservation organizations may reduce the effectiveness of conservation initiatives 
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due to the built-up expectations that if one initiative fails, another initiative with an 
untapped wallet will come in to either continue or replace the previous, oft-failed 
initiatives in that area. Chicken rearing, butterfly harvesting, and afforestation initiatives 
are not necessarily received wisdom from Western-based NGOs and local government 
representatives who have been influenced by such wisdom. All received wisdom cannot 
be considered an evil to be shunned by the underdeveloped world; Technological 
appropriation and diffusion are cultural constants. And where there are large funds (and 
competition) available to “improve” on technology, there will be places to appropriate its 
diffusion, such as mosquito nets provided by NGOs in Kenya’s Western Province that are 
used not for sleeping under but are instead used for fishing and farming. Communities 
adapt the technology for their perceived needs instead of their intended use due to the 
perceived needs of those communities who prioritize their needs and in turn trump the 
perceived needs and/or desires of NGO and government health agencies (Otenyo, 2011). 
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1 There were attempts to contact NABU representatives, but there were no returned responses. 
 
2 While the quotations taken from the NABU website are verbatim, it should be noted that the English 
version of the websites appear to be roughly translated from German and may be an unmonitored electronic 
translation. Therefore, the intention of phrasing by NABU may not be as condescending as the website 
phrasing implies. 
 
3 The order of villager groups involved in the project is listed spatially and not alphabetically or 
hierarchically. This spatial order runs from south to north. 
 
4 According to Patrick Sirya, this group of poachers never felt comfortable being a part of the project, for 
they felt it would entrap them and highlight them as being a group conducting the illegal activity and 
therefore be targets of arrest and/or violence from the KWS. It was also frustrating for Nature Kenya due to 
the demands of the Dida poachers group wanting aid groups to provide everything for the project instead of 
registering as a group, paying the cost of establishing that group, and managing it with group-contributed 
funds (personal interview, July 29, 2011). 
 
5 Ngamani group members also stated that goats were good for Christmas holidays, but they did not express 
other benefits for goat rearing. While Dida wanted to rear goats, Ngamani group members claimed that 
	   	   108 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
anti-bushmeat members in Dida are now keeping hares, but they stated hares also didn’t survive in 
Ngamani. I was not given a reason for this. 
 
6 These species types are assumed, as it wasn’t clarified which goat species were recommended, but 
according to the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI), these two species are the predominant 
species in dryland areas of Kenya (Korir, 2008). 
 
7 The price of maize flour (unga ya mahindi) fluctuates often, yet it more often increases in price rather 
than decreases. Some villagers adjacent to ASF have insisted that since the election violence of 2007, the 
Coastal Province has experienced an unprecedented increase in food prices. This was initially due to the 
cost of shipping food to the coast from the Central Province during the violence that shut down much of the 
commerce in Kenya. But once those routes were operating at pre-election levels, food prices continued to 
increase. Sustained drought which reduces the amount of unga grown in the state, and importing it from 
neighboring Tanzania both continue to increase the cost of a crop that is vital in maintaining Kenyan food 
culture and dietary demands. 
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CHAPTER VII 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The complex nature of studying PFM makes it a challenge to understand all of the 
possible aspects that make a PFM project successful or unsuccessful. The definition of 
success is relative to stakeholders and those who fund projects around the forest. Being 
an outside researcher from the West increases the difficulties of working with smaller 
communities. And due to my limited amount of time working in the field and talking with 
the diverse range of stakeholders involved, this thesis presents an understanding of how 
the perceptions between actors and its political complexities at the local level. This 
includes the different roles that actors have within communities and the unknown 
perceptions between these communities. While spending time with the diverse set of 
communities and stakeholders would help in better understanding these complexities, it 
would by no means allow me to fully comprehend them as the dynamics of my role—and 
thus perceptions of my role—can shift how future collaborations can play out. These 
possible complications can be seen in the actor role negotiations during my fieldwork and 
should also be studied in depth. 
As an affiliate with both FoASF, NMK, and ARK (at different times more 
affiliated with one than the other), my role was not only seen as that of a researcher 
looking at how forest resources were utilized and the impacts it had on communities, 
forest governance, and forest ecological dynamics, it was also seen as a participant in 
enforcement. During transect data collection or when monitoring snare activity within the 
forest boundary, my role was also seen as a dismantler and confiscator of snare wire 
material that would be taken back to KWS headquarters and delivered to the warden. 
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Challenging this role expectation brought about different results depending on the actor. 
For FoASF, the only challenge made was verbally during informal discussions. During 
these discussions, I expressed my misgivings about filling this role by explaining that my 
role perception was more that of the observer than a participant in enforcement. Members 
of the ASFMT reacted differently to my role challenge. 
 The initial challenge was that of my participation in confiscating camping gear, 
clothing, and logging material found at a small-scale lumber operations within the forest 
(specifically in the nature reserve portion of the forest). As an affiliate of FoASF, an 
affiliate of KWS, and I entered the camp, the occupants of the camp scattered into the 
forest, as we had caught them by surprise. The KWS affiliate told me that it is policy for 
all material found during these discoveries to be confiscated at that time and returned to 
the KWS headquarters at the edge of the forest. Feeling I had reached the limits of my 
role as observer and researcher, I refused to participate in the confiscation, which then led 
the KWS affiliate to abandon much of the confiscation as well since there was so much to 
haul back. Instead, we documented the location via GPS coordinates and returned with 
the confiscated snares found along the trail during our monitoring.  
 Upon returning and reporting the location to the KWS warden, it was clear that 
my expected role as a researcher and member of the greater conservation community had 
been to participate in the confiscation. The warden made it quite plain that the 
renegotiation of our professional working relationship was not a positive one. This 
became apparent when during every monitoring trip taken after that incident by the 
FoASF affiliate and me. Subsequently, armed KFS and KWS guards accompanied us 
whenever we were in ASF. Yet unlike the FoASF affiliate, I was not left alone. Instead of 
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offering explanations that spoke to needed security for armed poachers (as was my initial 
thought), it was explained to me that it was due to protection from elephants. In the many 
months during multiple years of conducting research within the forest also accessed by 
ASF’s elephant community, there had never been any concern for the safety of any 
person in any of the parties prior to the confiscation incident. During confiscation of 
poaching camps, etc. from that time forward, my role as confiscator was no longer 
expected, yet I was still in charge of hauling the snare wires back to camp—a role that I 
had not challenged with anyone other than my FoASF friend and affiliate during a 
moment of role reflexivity throughout casual conversation. 
 During this same conversation, I asked my friend if he also felt conflicted by 
these multiple roles: one as a forest monitor removing snares and documenting human-
inflicted forest disturbance, and the other as a member of the communities who were 
causing the forest disturbances (e.g. friends and family). Yet his roles seemed to be clear 
in his mind and speech. He explained that one role helps the other. Without his role as 
forest monitor and “whistleblower” of forest disturbance, the attention to the issue at 
large would fall by the wayside, and therefore there wouldn’t be any help (through 
foreign aid, government money streams, or new conservation initiatives) to change the 
situations that so many of the adjacent dwellers are faced with.  
 This personal example adds to the roles that actors are perceived to perform but 
are not the same as the actor’s own perception. Without communication between 
different actors on what limitations there may be for each other’s roles, frustration, 
stagnation, and possible collapse of conservation initiatives can occur. It is important to 
see how the concept of actor role perception is limited, and not just to conservation 
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initiatives in Kenya. Rather it is also an important component of all cross-cultural 
conservation projects in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond the continent.  
The literature on forest co-management is exhaustive, as this is an important 
global issue. How co-management has been addressed across the globe, its outcomes and 
challenges, have not been fully explored in this thesis. The limited literature review and 
theoretical frameworks addressed in this thesis best represent my research and 
understanding of how co-management operates both globally and locally, yet because of 
the field’s extensive analysis, this thesis merely scratches the surface, and therefore acts 
as a springboard for the larger issue as it applies to Kenya—and sub-Saharan Africa at 
large. 
 In addition, the PFM process in Kenya is an ongoing and evolving process, as its 
implementation is at an early stage (Coleman & Fleischman, 2012). Issues addressed in 
this thesis are snapshots of this process, and because stakeholders—both financial and 
non-financial—change periodically and without fanfare, documenting this evolution is 
difficult. To my knowledge, no longitudinal analysis on the PFM process has been 
conducted in Kenya, although there have been other snapshots performed to see how the 
process compares with multiple PFM projects around the world (Schreckenberg & 
Luttrell, 2009; Coleman & Fleischman, 2012). 
 Due to the sensitivity of illicit timber harvesting and animal trapping, discussions 
with those involved in the practices are largely non-existent. A trust relationship and 
proof of anonymity (beyond the promise of a researcher) are needed to explore the issues 
these communities are confronted with, as well as how intercommunity politics play a 
role in how the forest is accessed, managed, and harvested. 
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 In addition, the ecosystem dynamics of ASF are frequently changing, and 
monitoring all of the resource extraction within the forest is a daunting task that has been 
undertaken by a few local ecologists, NGOs, and researchers (me included). The 
methodology of systematically documenting forest activity is ongoing. FoASF, its 
affiliates, and KWS are currently conducting a longitudinal survey of ASF using 
geospatial software.  The aim of collecting this data is to help a diverse set of actors who 
are interested in conservation, whether it be to develop and adapt conservation initiatives, 
conduct academic/scientific research, or to develop and implement policies.  
As the resolution of orthophotos covering ASF becomes better, clearer, and more 
readily available, the function of remote sensing can play a large role in monitoring forest 
disturbance, not only by humans but also by elephants, as both species have large impacts 
on the habitat within the forest boundaries. In addition, as more faunal population surveys 
are conducted, the impact that disturbance has on both species and their habitats will 
become clearer. This data can then be combined with the longitudinal disturbance 
monitoring data that can ground truth the data collected from the remote sensing data. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
 Understanding tensions that exist between actors who are dependent on one 
another to accomplish common conservation goals is immensely complex. The variables 
that need to be addressed are far ranging, and some have been explored in this thesis. 
These variables include how different actor roles and the interrelationships between them 
provide access to different spaces and activities. This includes forest resource access, 
such as in the case of Jilore KFS guards sanctioning harvesting access to some but not to 
others. Also access to flows of aid based on the roles that villagers who initially had 
access to conservation or IGA training do not share it with others based on their belief 
that there should be additional compensation.   
 This thesis builds on the existing political ecology literature by arguing that 
imbalances of power, due in large part to the global world systems structure, establish 
participant roles through policies set by governments, NGOs, and discourses in 
environmental conservation. Governments often set environmental policies based on the 
needs of affluent states that utilize these spaces for leisure activities, such as tourism. 
NGOs perpetuate the designation of these spaces in two major ways. Firstly, they 
perpetuate the designation of protected space through the power of revenue from core 
states in the form of economic capital from both government and private donor funds. 
These funds are earmarked for specific conservation initiatives that promote either state-
sponsored interests/concerns or private interests/concerns, respectively.  
Secondly, NGOs choose areas that they feel need the most attention based on 
areas that peripheral state governments cannot (or choose not to) invest government funds 
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in. Disinvestment is largely due to a history of structural adjustment schemes that focus 
investment on capital-generating sectors, such as industries tied to global markets (e.g., 
commodities for export), land reform that favors private investments (e.g., 99-year land 
leases to foreign government-affiliated companies), and the removal of domestic 
spending on basic infrastructures, environmental health, and social programs. Because of 
the disinvestment of these sectors, NGOs fill these holes using foreign capital that is tied 
to the wishes of the foreign donors who provide the capital needed to start and/or 
maintain these initiatives. In this fashion, the global world systems structure—or core-
periphery power imbalance and dependency—is maintained.  
 Power imbalances are solidified through both government laws and NGO 
operational policies. State laws articulate state, parastatal, and villager roles. In the case 
of Kenya, these laws are the Kenya Constitution, Forests Act, and Societies Act. They are 
also articulated through parastatal non-legally binding guidelines created in 
environmental handbooks. NGOs solidify power imbalances through their desires to meet 
initiative objectives and through foreign donor decisions made far from where 
conservation initiatives are to be attempted or in the field. While environmental 
discourses state that participatory development is the best way for initiatives to succeed, 
NGOs that are funding the initiatives maintain their power so as to not feel their money is 
being wasted and the project is in control of the NGO.  
Power imbalances are also perpetuated through hegemonies of postcolonialism. 
The manners in which these postcolonial hegemonies manifest are in confluence with the 
global world systems structure. Hegemonic discourses of environmental conservation are 
global, regional, and local. These scales cannot be viewed independently, as the influence 
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of environmental conservation, roles of NGOs and state authorities, and the meanings of 
“environmental protection and conservation” before and after independence is multiscalar. 
Therefore, postcolonialism maintains the importance of role structures that reinforce the 
perceptions of participant roles in conservation initiatives and the inherent expectations in 
these perceptions. While actor role perceptions may be structural, acknowledging and 
being reflexive of this structure is necessary.  
 In writing about conservation initiatives in Papua New Guinea, anthropologist 
Paige West (2006) explores how a plethora of conservation initiatives set up in order to 
help local populations by capitalizing on the natural resources and their “values” can 
become so convoluted, that roles and expectations between actors can reach a point of 
irrelevance, and in its place, resentment, mistrust, and an enforcement of received 
wisdom. When initial attempts at communication fail or falter, it is often much easier to 
result to a “top down” approach to conservation management than the initial hopes of 
“bottom up” approaches.  
 In the first case study explored in this thesis, the stagnation (and perhaps 
inevitable collapse) of the PFM pilot project in Dida, appears to have much to do with the 
perceived roles of the immediate actors. But it is also multitude of tied hands due to state 
laws that can contradict themselves thus cannot be implemented easily. As a consequence, 
fortress conservation can be much easier to enforce—at least at some level. I have 
attempted to illustrate that other levels can make more difficult, such as the multiplicity 
of roles that each actor may have in different situations and with different actor 
interactions. These role multiplicities can contradict each other and therefore the 
perceptions within and between actor communities. Distrust of how contradictory these 
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roles can become has caused great tension between stakeholders (and future stakeholders, 
such as the two future CFA participants). 
 The Ngamani Anti-bushmeat Project is also intended to show that conservation 
initiatives can often break down due actor role perceptions that are not resolved—even 
after the conservation initiative collapses. Local participants of the project still remain 
frustrated by the lack of role fulfillment by NABU, and while NABU did not respond to 
my enquiries, it is assumed that they see the roles of the local participants as being played 
out, as evident from their promotion of the conservation initiative on their German-
language website (translatable to English). And it is all to common of a practice of 
waiting for the next conservation initiative to come in to replace the failed one or to pick 
up where the last one left off. And yet it is the local participants who are devoted to the 
failed conservation initiatives that are left without anything to show for their labor, 
energy, and passions.  
The two case studies examined clearly show that achieving awareness and 
understanding of role perceptions are paramount to increasing the success of participatory 
conservation initiatives intended to benefit both ecological conservation and community 
development. This thesis focuses on two types of conservation initiatives: PFM and the 
various IGAs that often accompany them. An increase in transparency is one way to 
increase understanding. A required submission of all published research, government 
documents, and parastatal handbooks to the local KEFRI library would be beneficial. As 
stated in Chapter II, the literature surrounding conservation initiatives and ecological 
research was largely absent from this public library.  
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 Awareness and understanding of role perceptions includes an obvious increase of 
transparency but it also must include engagement of how role perceptions manifest and 
perpetuate. This can be accomplished in a number of ways.  
One approach is to review various the failures and successes of past conservation 
initiatives in the area combined with an assessment of current issues, as well as ones that 
are perceived by multiple actors. Combining the assessments from the perspectives of 
actors at multiple scales can anticipate new approaches to how the initiatives should be 
tackled. Participants at multiple scales—with their diverse knowledge sets (Robbins, 
2000)—can be negotiated and used as benchmarks throughout the initiative process.  
To reduce unrealistic role expectations of a diverse set of participants, a 
conversation that focuses on perceived roles is necessary. But it is the reflective 
component that is key. One conversation is not enough. Multiple conversations—one at 
each benchmark reached—would not only increase transparency, but would also continue 
to keep the issue of role perceptions at the forefront of decision-making. In addition, 
reflection on how roles influence actions by participants is also important. 
Due to the uneven power dynamics in initiative design and implementation, 
NGOs, parastatal, and government officials, their reflexivity on roles is paramount. It is 
important for them to ask questions such as “what is my role?” and “how is it being 
perceived by other actors?” and by asking other actors “what do you expect us to do?” 
These would help alleviate confusion and animosity throughout the process. Everyone 
has hopes of initiative success, especially when money is either promised or utilized. 
Thus reflection upon how roles influence perceptions of progress may decrease failures 
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of conservation initiatives involving affluent global donors and marginalized local 
communities. 
 My own experiences as a white researcher affiliated with conservation 
organizations and individuals exemplifies why these questions are important. I faced 
many difficulties in trying to combine my role as an “objective” researcher and the 
perceived role of snare confiscator. The roles that I could have filled were more than just 
these two. If I chose to fill all of the perceived roles that the diverse individuals and 
groups I encountered expected me to, I would have been an activist for specific local 
organizations, a voice for land rights, a politician, a journalist, a promoter of KWS and 
KFS policies, an editor for locally-created conservation reports destined for European 
NGO donors, and an all-around wise man who had answers to many of the structural 
problems faced by communities including drought, crop failure, poverty, marginalization, 
and political incompetency. It was vital for me to ask the above questions to ground 
myself and how my role was perceived—regardless of whether I stated my own role 
perception before interviews and as succinctly as my translator and I thought possible. 
 As my research progressed, how I perceived my role altered. Role reflexivity 
revealed that I needed to be prepared for these roles perceived by communities, and if I 
did not fill them in some capacity, not only did I feel my legitimacy as a researcher 
declined, but also my abilities to help them in any way I could. Both of these fears are a 
symptom of postcolonialism. Finding a line between what I would do and what I 
wouldn’t do shifted throughout my research, and had I stayed longer than three months, I 
have no doubt my role would have continued to be negotiated by the communities I 
interacted with and within my self. 
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This thesis is intended to assist in opening up avenues of dialogue that have been 
either disregarded or not explored during the history of these initiatives. While much of 
this information may not be new to those who live and work in the area, multiple parties I 
met with expressed that my added voice to the conversation is very helpful in addressing 
breakdowns in communication and differences of opinions in how initiatives should be 
carried out increase animosity between participants in conservation initiatives. It is my 
intention to provide both my own voice and opinions with this information, and also to 
give voice to many underrepresented people in these processes.  
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APPENDIX A 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
USAID – United States Agency for International Development 
ASF – Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Reserve 
ASFADA – Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Adjacent Dwellers Association 
ASFMT – Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Management Team 
ASSETS – Arabuko-Sokoke Schools and Eco-Tourism Scheme 
CBO – Community-Based Organization 
CFA – Citizen Forest Association 
CIFOR – Center for International Forestry Research 
CPR – Common Pool Resource(s) 
DIFAAFA – Dida Forest Adjacent Area Forest Association 
EU – European Union 
FADA – Forest Adjacent Dwellers Association (later ASFADA) 
FMU – Forest Management Unit 
FoASF – Friends of the Arabuko-Sokoke Forest 
IGA – Income Generating Activities 
KEFRI – Kenya Forestry Research Institute 
KFS – Kenya Forest Service 
KFWG – Kenya Forest Working Group 
KSH – Kenya Shillings 
KWS – Kenya Wildlife Service 
NABU – Nature and Biodiversity Union 
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NGO – Non-Government Organization 
NMK – National Museums of Kenya 
PAR – Participatory Action Research 
PFM – Participatory Forest Management 
PRA – Participatory Rural Appraisal 
UN – United Nations  
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APPENDIX B 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1. Dida Area PRA Results (ASFMT, 1998) 
Sub-
group 
Problem 11 Problem 2 Problem 3 Problem 4 Problem 5 Problem 6 
Elders 
Inadequate 
water supply 
Human/ 
Wildlife 
conflict 
Poor roads 
(inadequate 
food?) 
Inadequate 
health 
facilities 
Low income 
Inadequate 
schools 
Middle-
Aged 
men 
Inadequate 
water supply 
Human/ 
Wildlife 
conflict 
Lack of 
quality seeds 
Inadequate 
maternity 
facilities 
Inadequate 
agricultural 
inputs 
Inadequate 
schools 
Women 
Human/ 
Wildlife 
conflict 
Inadequate 
health 
facilities 
Inadequate 
water supply 
Lack of local 
market 
Lack of 
secondary 
schools 
Poor roads 
(tied with 
problem 5) 
Youth Low income 
Inadequate 
water supply 
Human/ 
Wildlife 
conflict 
Low 
agricultural 
yields 
Human 
diseases (e.g. 
malaria) 
Livestock 
diseases 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The exact ranking of each group’s issues cannot be verified except the women’s group, as the hand-
written ranking (incl. vote count) was included as appendix 5 of that document, and this hand-written 
ranking is different than the reported ranking in the body of the PRA report (appendix used in above chart). 
Appendix 4 shows “cause and effect” flowchart of the elders subgroup, and this with the three causes 
including “inadequate food” as one of the top three, yet the body of the PRA report lists it as “poor roads” 
which is found nowhere in the flowchart.	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Figure 1. Interdependency Web 
 
This figure shows the inter- and intra-dependencies between actors at multiple scales. 
Thick arrows indicate traditional role dependencies under strict state-managed forest, 
while the thin arrows indicate increasing complexity of role dependencies between actors 
under joint-forest management. This web is used to help understand complexities of role 
expectations. 
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